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Europe needs social democracy! 
Why do we really want Europe? Can we demonstrate to European citizens the 
opportunities offered by social politics and a strong social democracy in Europe? 
This is the aim of the new Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung project »Politics for Europe«. 
It shows that European integration can be done in a democratic, economic and 
socially balanced way and with a reliable foreign policy. 
The following issues will be particularly important:
–  Democratic Europe
–  Economic and social policy in Europe
–  Foreign and security policy in Europe
The FES will devote itself to these issues in publications and events: we start 
from citizens’ concerns, identify new positions with decision-makers and lay out 
alternative policy approaches. We want a debate with you about »Politics for 
Europe«!
Further information on the project can be found here: 
www.fes.de/de/politik-fuer-europa
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is the oldest political foundation in Germany 
with a rich tradition dating back to its foundation in 1925. Today, it remains loyal 
to the legacy of its namesake and campaigns for the core ideas and values of so-
cial democracy: freedom, justice and solidarity. It has a close connection to social 
democracy and free trade unions.
FES promotes the advancement of social democracy, in particular by:
–  Political educational work to strengthen civil society
–  Think Tanks
–   International cooperation with our international network of offices in more 
than 100 countries
–  Support for talented young people
–   Maintaining the collective memory of social democracy with archives, libraries 
and more.
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 –  Four main strategies of social democratic competi-
tion can be distinguished when the official party positions 
on salient political issues are compared with the positions 
of core voter groups on the same issues: 1) Corbynism 
(Left-wing economic polarisation); 2) Macronism (pro-mar-
ket economic polarisation coupled with culturally progres-
sive/libertarian stances); 3) Progressive-libertarian distanc-
ing (the adoption of moderate economic stances with 
culturally progressive policies) and 4) Catch-all (traditional 
social democratic centrism). The results from the Europe-
an countries included in the study show that, with regard 
to the relative positioning of social democratic parties vis-
à-vis their core voter groups, the most beneficial strate-
gies, in terms of electoral appeal, are the traditional so-
cial-democratic catch-all strategy of moderation along 
both the economic and cultural dimensions, as well as the 
Corbynist strategy of polarisation along the economic di-
mension.
 – The core element of Corbynism is the adoption of a 
strategic position somewhat to the left of Labour’s core 
voter groups – those who intend to vote for the party 
and potential voters (with a high vote propensity for the 
party). Emphasising core left-wing policy priorities (social 
investment, social justice, healthcare, affordable housing 
and education) resonates well with core voter groups, 
with these policy proposals being popular far beyond 
centre left voters.
 – Macronism appears to be a successful strategy, at least 
initially. Moving beyond the ideological centre on the 
economic left-right dimension and adopting a pro-mar-
ket economic strategy, including a pledge to reform the 
economy, allows parties to successfully appeal to a wide 
range of centre-left and centre-right voters. However, it 
has to be noted that Macronism is an economically right-
wing strategy, which entails libertarian and pro-Europe-
an stances on the cultural dimension. Such a strategy 
could prove detrimental in the long run, particularly for 
traditionally left-wing parties – such shifts to the right 
(like the Third Way in the 1980s–1990s) could back-fire. 
Adopting such centre-right policy stances makes parties 
vulnerable to accusations of voter betrayal, of working 
for the benefit of wealthy business elites, rather than 
middle- and working-class citizens.
 –  Progressive libertarian distancing is a strategy where-
by social democratic parties adopt more profound liber-
tarian/progressive positions (versus more conservative, 
nationalist and authoritarian stances) than the bulk of 
their voters, as well as strong support for European inte-
gration and environmental protection policies. This strat-
egy minimises the distance to main progressive competi-
tors (Green and social-liberal parties) of social democrats. 
However, such a strategy makes it more difficult for vot-
ers to distinguish social democrats from their main com-
petitors and appears to result in an electorally toxic mix of 
economic moderation combined with radical positions 
on cultural issues, such as immigration, (sexual) minority 
rights and multiculturalism. Most social democratic par-
ties traditionally have – at least partly – a socially conser-
vative voter base that do not favour a full embrace of 
multiculturalism and globalisation. Our evidence shows 
that social democratic parties that adopt such a strategy 
risk making the traditional social democratic voter per-
ceive this as an abandonment of conventional centre-left 
social democratic core values and policies of social pro-
tection. 
 – In some countries Social Democratic parties have largely 
stuck to their traditional catch-all strategy of modera-
tion and centrism on both the economic and cultural di-
mensions. These parties were able to hold on to the 
more culturally conservative (working class) voter groups 
without alienating progressives. This catch-all strategy is 
evidenced by the adoption of policy positions on both 
dimensions that are very close to the ›median‹ voter 
among broad groups of potential voters. However, to 
distinguish social democrats from the centre-right (with 
whom they compete or even coalesce) these ›catch-all‹ 
parties adopt economic positions slightly to the left of 
their core electorate.
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INTRODUCTION
Recent elections in many European countries have resulted 
in resounding electoral losses for social democratic parties. 
In the Netherlands, Austria and Italy, social democratic par-
ties have been ousted from government. In France, Parti 
Socialiste obtained the worst result in its history in both the 
parliamentary and presidential election, with a similar his-
toric low befalling the Dutch PvdA. The German and Swed-
ish social democrats were also considerably weakened in 
recent elections, yet able to return to government. UK’s La-
bour Party, on the contrary, did substantially better than in 
2015, gaining nearly 10 percent in the 2017 election.
These recent losses for social democrats across European 
democracies are part of a long-term decline plaguing tradi-
tional centre-left political parties. Over the last decade, Eu-
ropean social democratic parties have faced increasing 
electoral competition from multiple corners of the political 
spectrum. Studies indicate that in many countries the tradi-
tional social democratic voter base is particularly vulnerable 
to appeals from the radical socialist left, green environ-
mentalist parties as well as radical right-wing populist com-
petitors. In addition, libertarian right-wing parties are also 
contributing to an erosion of social democratic support, as 
evidenced in France, where Emmanuel Macron’s Repub-
lique En Marche (LREM) was able to attract many former 
Parti Socialiste voters, as did the social liberal Democrats 
66 (D66) in the Netherlands. Finally, as social democrats 
traditionally have a substantial voter base in the political 
centre, many of their previous voters are eying centre-right 
competitors. Do these losses indicate a temporary malaise, 
or is it possible that the political pendulum will swinging 
back in favour of the centre-left, as has hapened in the 
2017 UK election? How did the different social democratic 
parties respond to political pressures and how have they 
attempted to stop the electoral haemorrhaging into sever-
al ideological directions?
IDEOLOGICAL SHIFTS AND ELECTORAL 
COMPETITION OF THE CENTRE-LEFT 
With a ›Third Way‹ strategy, social democratic parties 
adopted a more ideologically moderate profile in the late 
1980s, embracing elements of the neo-liberal economic 
agenda. In the eyes of many voters, this shift diluted the 
parties’ traditional left-wing profile, at the heart of which 
stood the protection of welfare-state arrangements, pro-
motion of trade unionism and collective bargaining for bet-
ter working conditions and higher wages, attainment of 
greater social justice by means of redistribution of wealth 
and knowledge (including accessible education). In the 
view of many, the centre-left has abandoned much of its 
original identity associated with the protection of workers’ 
rights, as social democratic support for labour market flexi-
bility has created a more competitive labour market with far 
lower levels of de-commodification. This has exacerbated 
social and economic inequalities – a trend accelerated by a 
rollback of the welfare state pursued by ever more power-
ful right-wing parties. Although these policy shifts have 
made social democratic parties credible coalition partners 
in the eyes of the centre-right, they also provided challeng-




Election results overview (in percentages)
 
Name/country Historic high (year) Historic low (year) Last election Recent loss/gain
Labour (UK) 48.8 (1951) 29.0 (2010) 40.0 (2017) + 9.6
SPÖ (AUT) 51.0 (1979) 26.8 (2013) 26.9 (2017) + 0.1
SAP (SWE) 50.1 (1964) 28.3 (2018) 28.3 (2018) – 2.7
PD (ITA) 33.2 (2008) 18.7 (2018) 18.7 (2018) – 6.7
PvdA (NL) 33.8 (1977) 5.7 (2017) 5.7 (2017) – 19.0
PS (FRA)* 37.5 (1981) 7.4 (2017) 7.4 (2017) – 22.0
* 1st round proportion and after ‘foundation’ of PS around Mitterand
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tunity to portray social democrats as ›traitors‹ of the (work-
ing) poor, enabling newcomers were able to make inroads 
on traditional electoral turf of social democrats.  
The transformation of the political landscape and the ma-
jor issue dimensions of political competition also went 
hand in hand with a change in the electoral fortunes of the 
centre-left. Since the 1980s, green parties have become a 
key competitor of the social democrats. As leftist parties 
with progressive values and a cosmopolitan outlook, envi-
ronmentalist parties have become one of the main allies 
and coalition partners of social democrats, yet also one of 
their main competitors. In contrast to the radical left, the 
appeal of the Greens poses a challenge to social democrats 
when it comes to attracting young, progressive mid-
dle-class voters, students and intellectuals. Traditionally, 
green parties have been particularly popular with younger 
voters, to whom post-materialist values are of greater im-
portance than the economic materialism of their parents’ 
generation. Green voters are more likely to prioritise eco-
logical protection over economic growth and view the en-
vironment as an ecosystem that is not a mere commodity 
to be used for capitalist wealth-creation. Thus, they advo-
cate taking steps to mitigate pollution, depletion of re-
sources and climate change, even if this would have nega-
tive economic implications. As many millennials take 
economic prosperity for granted, the ›low-growth or no-
growth‹ scenario of environmentalist parties, coupled with 
a commitment to economic egalitarianism, is very appeal-
ing to younger voters. Greening the economic dimension 
with issues related to ecological justice has blurred the ini-
tial difference between the environmental (green-grey) 
and the economic left-right dimensions of electoral com-
petition. Moreover, Green parties usually adopt culturally 
libertarian stances combined with left-wing economic po-
sitions, which allows for a successful appeal to social dem-
ocratic voters with a combination of post-materialism, en-
vironmentalism, social justice, emancipation and (gender) 
equality.
In addition to the challengers competing with social dem-
ocrats on the left of the political spectrum, the rise of the 
›radical right‹ has also posed a new challenge confronting 
social democratic parties with different obstacles. Howev-
er, we argue that the ›radical right‹ is often misunderstood 
and the label is misleading. Most parties that are branded 
›far‹, ›extreme‹ or ›radical‹ right are actually relatively cen-
trist on welfare state policies – protecting health-care, un-
employment and childcare benefits and pensions – yet 
they are radical and extremist on cultural issues, such as 
immigration and multiculturalism. Needless to say, they are 
still pro-market and against redistribution. In that sense, 
the ›radical right‹ is amplifying the salience of issues tradi-
tionally »owned« by the right, while facilitating the con-
struction and formation of right-wing governments. The 
greatest challenge the radical right poses to social democ-
racy, however, is its appeal to working-class voters – a tra-
ditional element of the social democratic voter base. At 
first glance, it may strike one as surprising that the radical 
anti-immigration right would appeal to the same voters as 
the centre-left. The radical right is normally associated with 
cultural conservatism, hostility towards immigration, a na-
tionalist stance and authoritarian tendencies when it 
comes to law-and-order issues. yet their populist policies 
of nativist protectionism resonate strongly with working 
and lower middle-class voters. The anti-immigrant populist 
right often argue that social benefits should be reserved 
primarily, if not exclusively, for the ›deserving‹ native popu-
lation, and withheld from ›con artists‹ and ›undeserving‹ 
immigrants. This ›welfare chauvinism‹ sets radical right-
wing parties apart from more traditional right-wing parties 
that often advocate purer forms of economic liberalism. In 
this sense, the radical anti-immigrant right bears some re-
semblance to the political left in its support for general 
welfare arrangements (pensions, unemployment benefits, 
health care, child-care and family support).
ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE AND  
INTERNAL SHIFTS
Despite an overall decline in electoral trends for the left, 
some successes have been registered by social democratic 
parties such as, for example, the impressive gain made by 
Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party in the 2017 UK general elec-
tion, as well as the formation of left-wing (minority) gov-
ernments in Portugal and Spain by coalescing with radical 
left forces (communists and PODEMOS/regional parties re-
spectively).
Many observers point to social democratic parties’ estrange-
ment from their historical voter base as the main reason for 
their electoral demise. If social democratic parties are haem-
orrhaging support to all corners of the political spectrum, 
however, this begs an important question: Where do social 
democratic parties need to position themselves to bring key 
groups of voters back into the fold and/or attract new vot-
ers?   
To answer this question empirically, we analyse official pol-
icy positions of political parties based on the party plat-
forms of six major European social democratic parties, as 
well as those of their competitors. To clarify the complexity 
of party competition, we plot political parties in two-di-
mensional political landscapes comprised of the major eco-
nomic and cultural dimensions of political rivalry. In addi-
tion to these traditional social democratic parties, we 
include a case of crucial importance – the liberal République 
En Marche, headed by former social democratic minister 
Emmanuel Macron. Within the space of a few months after 
its creation, En Marche swept presidential and parliamenta-
ry elections, in what constituted the implosion of the party 
system of the Fifth Republic. 
As the various case studies below illustrate, social demo-
cratic parties across Europe have adopted different strate-
gies in order to maximise their electoral appeal, with vary-
ing degrees of success. The strategy of the Labour Party in 
the UK, for example, is to emphasise economic issues over 
cultural ones. In Austria and Sweden, social democrats 
have adopted a traditional »catch-all« strategy, seeking to 
appeal to a broad section of the electorate, while social 
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democratic parties in France and the Netherlands have 
moved towards the progressive pole of the political spec-
trum on the cultural dimension, and closer to the centre 
with regard to economic issues.
What lessons can be learned from these various strategies? 
What policy stances are most beneficial electorally and 
which policy shifts are best avoided if social democratic 
parties are to be successful again in upcoming elections? 
By exploring the ever more complex nature of political 
challenges faced by social democracy, this paper aims to 
provide an answer to this pivotal question.
Strategies of political parties are identified by comparing 
the position in the political landscape of each social demo-
cratic party in its national political landscape vis-a-vis two 
voter groups: (1) core voters – those who express an in-
tention to vote for the social democratic party and (2) po-
tential voters – those with a high voting propensity for 
the social democratic party (8, 9 or 10), but with an inten-
tion to vote for another party.
Our case selection includes a broad variety of cases in 
terms of electoral system (UK: First-Past-The-Post, France: 
2nd round plurality, Austria, Netherlands and Sweden: pro-
portional systems, in Italy – a mixed system un 2017 com-
bining FPTP and PR). There are differences in terms of the 
parties’ electoral performance as well: some have previous-
ly gained majorities nationally (SPÖ and SAP) and others 
had their peak at around one-third of the vote. In addition, 
Labour, SAP, PD and PS governed in single party (minority) 
governments, while PvdA and SPÖ always governed as a 
coalition partner with the centre right.
In the section below, we describe the methodology used 
to position political parties and voters in the national polit-
ical landscapes and provide a summary of how the data 
was collected. In the sections that follow, different case 
studies are analysed and four main strategies of social 




HOW PARTIES AND VOTERS WERE 
POSITIONED IN THE POLITICAL LANDSCAPE
This study offers in-depth analyses of the positions of po-
litical parties within national party systems, as well as of 
the distance between party platforms and parties’ (poten-
tial) voters. These analyses are based on a party coding 
methodology in which experts place political parties on a 
large number of salient political issues that are all related to 
the main dimensions of political competition – an econom-
ic left-right dimension, and a cultural GAL-TAN dimension 
(see detailed explanation of the dimensions below), follow-
ing a careful reading and assessment of their election plat-
forms (manifestoes), party websites, campaign documents 
and media statements of party leaders and officials. Not 
only party positions were collected, but also voter opinions 
on the same issues. Both party position and voter data 
were collected through voting advice application (VAA) 
websites that were fielded in each of the countries and by 
which we mapped the opinions of thousands of voters on 
the same issues on which the political parties were calibrat-
ed. Comparing the evidence-based expert placements of 
parties and the voters’ self-placement on issues, allows for 
carefully matching official party stances with voter prefer-
ences. Using both respondents’ vote intention and vote 
propensities, we distinguish between social democratic 
›likely voters‹ and ›potential voters‹ (or ›sympathisers‹).
For the analyses in this paper, two types of graphs are used. 
First, we plot two core voter groups on the two-dimension-
al landscape using spatial density heatmaps to assess vot-
ers’ proximity or distance from the social democratic party. 
We distinguish between social democratic sympathisers 
(potential voters) and actual voters in relation to the posi-
tions of political parties within the political landscape. Vot-
ers’ and sympathisers’ positions were extrapolated from 
their answers to the same issues on which parties were al-
so coded. Voters of a given party are identified with the use 
of a »voting intention« question asking respondents which 
party they were planning to vote for in upcoming parlia-
mentary elections. Sympathisers of a given party are seg-
mented by using an 11-point »propensity-to-vote« scale on 
which respondents assess the probability that they will vote 
for the respective parties, ranging from 0 = »would never 
vote for the party« to 10 = »would certainly vote for the 
party«. Those respondents who have a vote propensity of 
8, 9 or 10 for a party included in the analyses, yet intended 
to vote for another party, were classified as sympathisers. 
The coloured area in the heatmap reveals where most re-
spondents are located after being plotted in the two-di-
mensional political space. The yellow (low-density) and blue 
(high-density) areas show where respondents are concen-
trated (spatial density). The darker the blue colour, the 
greater the concentration of respondents. White areas do 
not necessarily indicate the absence of respondents – they 
merely show that the respondent concentration is very low, 
i. e. very few respondents are located at these positions. 
The second type of graphs show all relevant political parties 
in the political landscape based on aggregated issue posi-
tions, with their standard deviation on each of the two po-
litical axes, enabling us to assess their ›ideological spread‹ 
across the landscape. The party position diagrams on the 
following pages indicate the spatial positions of electorally 
relevant parties on two-dimensional spatial maps based on 
expert-calibration of 30 salient issue-statements. The most 
salient issues in each election were identified by a team of 
scholars, election experts and journalists following a close 
examination of the parties’ manifestos and the political 
(media) discourse. Each of the statements pertains to a pol-
icy proposal that can be associated with the main econom-
ic and cultural issue dimensions, framed into a »left-wing«, 
»right-wing«, »libertarian« or »authoritarian« vein. The 
statement answers are 5-point scales ranging from »com-
pletely disagree«, »disagree«, »neutral« and »agree« to 
»completely agree«. Next to coding the positions of parties 
on the issues in accordance with their official policy propos-
als, we also asked the political parties to position them-
selves, while requiring them to also provide evidence for 
their stances by presenting relevant excerpts from their par-
ty manifesto or other formal documentation, as a means of 
substantiating their self-positioning. This self-placement 
performed by the parties was then compared with the cod-
ing performed by independent political experts. Discrepan-
cies were communicated to parties in several rounds of in-
teraction until there was complete clarity and their final 
positions on issues were approved. 
TWO DIMENSIONS OF  
POLITICAL COMPETITION
Parties and voters are plotted on political landscapes com-
prised of two dimensions. While political competition in the 
post-war period was largely oriented towards economic is-
sues such as employment, taxation, wages, government 
spending and the development of the welfare state, non- 
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material political issues have always remained. During the 
1990s, political competition increasingly became more cul-
tural and non-material in nature. Traditionally, this non-ma-
terial dimension related specifically to the cleavage between 
orthodox and permissive Christians, as in the Netherlands, 
or between religious and non-religious voters, as in France, 
and more broadly to the difference between more conserv-
ative-orthodox positions versus more progressive and per-
missive stances. Recent research has shown that despite of 
the continuing relevance of the left–right divide – the cultur-
al dimension has become salient, dividing those who favour 
cultural liberalism from those who favour restrictive immi-
gration policies. The debate on European integration and 
particularly the immigration-issue has not only rendered this 
non-material dimension more salient, but also more com-
plex. The complex multi-dimensionality of this non-econom-
ic dimension, has been described as GAL-TAN, in which a 
Green, Alternative and Libertarian (GAL) position faces a 
Traditional, Authoritarian and Nationalistic (TAN) outlook in 
life. This GAL-TAN dimension is the result of three highly cor-
related dimensions (Green versus Grey, Alternative-cosmo-
politanism versus Traditional nationalism and Libertarian 
permissiveness versus Authoritarianism). 
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FOUR STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL 
DEMOCRATIC PARTIES
CORBYNISM: ECONOMIC POLARISATION
The strategy of the Labour Party is identified by means of 
comparing the position of the party in the British political 
landscape with the position of two voter groups: (1) core 
voters – those who intend to vote for the party and (2) sym-
pathisers – those with high vote propensity for the party (8, 
9 or 10), but who intend to vote for another party. The La-
bour Party is situated to the left of both its voters and poten-
tial voters in a strategy we characterise as economic polarisa-
tion. In the 2017 election, under the leadership of Jeremy 
Corbyn, Labour adopted a more radical economic agenda 
which clearly pushed the party to the left on the economic di-
mension, actually further to the left than both Labours’ core 
voters and sympathisers. At the same time, Labour was very 
closely aligned to both voter groups on the cultural dimen-
sion. Corbyn’s Labour Party has succeeded in polarising pub-
lic opinion on economic matters, attracting numerous voters 
to cast their ballots for it. In the face of ongoing austerity and 
deregulation, numerous British citizens had become econom-
ically worse off or felt less economically secure as a result of 
two consecutive Conservative governments, contributing to 
Labour’s gains in the 2017 election. Corbyn successfully po-
larised the general public on economic issues and moved the 
Labour Party to the left, as exemplified by the analyses in the 
graphs below. Many pundits and observers have criticised 
Corbyn for this development, arguing that such a strategy 
poses a risk of alienating centrist voters now and in the fu-
ture. This prophecy did not come into fruition, however, as 
Labour regained numerous seats under Corbyn in 2017 and is 
leading in many polls as of January 2019. Nevertheless, in 
terms of cultural issues, Labour and its voters and sympathis-
ers are all on the same page, as evidenced by their relatively 
similar positions on the authoritarian-libertarian dimension.
United Kingdom: Labour Party 
LABOUR IN THE 2017 ELECTION
A particular point of weakness for Labour relates to eco-
nomic governance. As much as the party has been able to 
play on popular discontent with the ever more visible ef-
fects of the austerity agenda pursued since 2010, this has 
been balanced by concern that a Labour government 
would mean a return to Keynesian ›tax-and-spend‹ policies 
last seen in the 1970s. There is little evidence that the par-
ty has moved to adapt and cope with the new economic 
situation characterized by globalisation and digitalisation, 
with all the disruption that these trends bring. Again, ab-
sence of the modernising Blairite rhetoric among the sen-
ior leadership allows Labour to be painted as defenders of 
an order from a bygone era.
Jeremy Corbyn’s focus on economic issues, made apparent 
not only by his slogan »For the many, not the few«, but by 
his perceived economically and culturally progressive gen-
eral strategy, resonated with an austerity-ridden and eco-
nomically worse-off and less economically-secure British 
citizenry. He attracted numerous voters to cast their ballot 
for Labour and surprised everyone by running the Conserv-
atives close. Now the trade union movement has shifted to 
the left in that respect, which pushed Labour to the left.
Nevertheless, Labour appears to be more radical in terms 
of rhetoric than actual policy stances. The 2017 manifesto 
is not as radical as it is projected, showing a gap between 
rhetoric and actual party policy. For instance, Labour, al-
though it claims to be the party of low-income voting 
groups, largely focused, in its flagship policy on abolishing 
university fees, on the educational chances of middle-class 
children. Indeed, one can see parallels between Corbyn 
and the 70s, yet they are not primarily about spending but 
about »control« over the economy.
 
Labour is also ambiguous about »Brexit«: its manifesto was 
emphatically not a rejection of Brexit, Corbyn himself says 
he will honour the outcome of the 2016 referendum which 
a) aligns with his own sceptical view on the EU and b) will 
make another referendum difficult to achieve despite the 
views of Labour members and voters who want one and 
many would vote »remain«. Overall, the advantage or dis-
advantage of this »constructive ambiguity« is not entirely 
clear: given the extreme liberal view of some voters on eco-
nomic and cultural questions does not align with the offi-
cial party line in respect to immigration (which argues it 
should be restricted where jobs are threatened).
Whether Labour gets much credit from this restrictive policy 
is a moot point since it is reluctant to talk too much about it 
lest it offend its very liberal membership and because it is in 
any case drowned out by its left-liberal stance on other is-
sues that has recently allowed it to steal voters from the 
Greens. In foreign policy, Labour is sometimes perceived as 
»soft« on defence, too critical towards NATO, »pro-Rus-
sian«, and flirting with one-sided nuclear disarmament.
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The problem with making out a trend is that Corbyn only 
fought one election against an incredibly poor Conserva-
tive leader and campaign – one which didn’t even bother 
to cost Labour’s manifesto and tear it to shreds like the 
Tories usually (and often very successfully) do. Moreover, 
Labour piled up votes where it did not need them rather 
than, say, in marginal seats in the Midlands and small 
towns it has to win in order to get a majority in parlia-
ment. Labour is 60 seats behind – so Corbyn’s strategy is 
not very effective in the UK, although it may work in a 
country with PR, where 40 per cent of the votes »would 
be a dream result«.
It is crucial to note, too, that being too economically radi-
cal (at least in opposition) makes one a less credible con-
tender for government: perceived competence is still in-
credibly important to voters, who are much less tribal than 
they used to be.
Labour was probably helped in 2017 by its huge member-
ship growth, much of which was undeniably down to Cor-
byn. However, it has brought into the party large swaths of 
members who are trying to transform the party into a so-
cial movement, which they believe will eventually win elec-
tions and facilitate a transformative Labour government.
Labour has historically been very strong in Scotland: it used 
to obtain 60 seats from Scotland, but it doesn’t normally 
need Scottish seats to win since, when it wins, it normally 
wins big. The current situation is different: Labour might 
need to form a coalition or at least get support from the 
SNP – possibly easier to sell now that the Conservatives 
have done a deal with the DUP.
In the long term, Labour should benefit from society be-
coming more multicultural and more liberal. At the mo-
ment, it is widely seen as too radical and too incompetent 
to be elected in government. In any normal electoral cycle, 
and given the chaos engulfing the Conservative govern-
ment, Labour could have been 10–20 points ahead in the 
opinion polls. Instead it is normally running a few points 
behind or maximally leading with a very slim margin.
STRATEGIES AND DEBATES WITHIN  
THE LABOUR PARTy
The Labour party has undergone one of the more disrup-
tive periods in its existence in recent years. The long pro-
cess of managing the legacy (and fall-out) from Tony 
Blair’s period as leader has continued throughout the lead-
ership of his three successors. Under Blair, Labour moved 
towards the political centre, adopting a moderate Third 
Way platform in order to distance itself from more tradi-
tional conceptions of socialism. While this strategy result-
ed in unprecedented success for the party in the form of 
three consecutive election victories and subsequent La-
bour governments, it also led many observers to assert 
Figure 1
Spatial position and density of Labour sympathisers
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that the Labour party lacked a political identity. In the 
2010 election, Labour, led by Gordon Brown, registered its 
worst result in the post-war period up until then, only to 
be followed by an even more embarrassing electoral per-
formance in 2015, under the leadership of Ed Miliband. 
While Gordon Brown had made some relatively minor 
moves back to a more traditionally socialist policy line, Ed 
Miliband and especially Jeremy Corbyn have sought a res-
olute return, with each seeking in his own way to reaffirm 
the ›old Labour‹ agenda of social justice, wealth redistribu-
tion and state intervention. This repositioning has been ac-
companied by considerable tensions, however. Most obvi-
ously, while Corbyn appears to enjoy strong support from 
his constituency of party members, he remains at odds 
with most of his party representatives in Parliament (re-
cently resulting in the breakaway of several MP’s into a 
new political movement).
It is important to avoid overstating the extent to which the 
party platform and policies have shifted under Corbyn. The 
party’s 2017 election manifesto is quite similar to the views 
held by Miliband; it is the rhetoric that has changed, re-
flecting Corbyn’s political style, grounded in his long expe-
rience as a backbench rebel. Thus, although the current 
party manifesto has taken on some of Corbyn’s edgier 
rhetoric, it is also rather moderate, as calls for nuclear dis-
armament or full re-nationalisation of various industries 
were removed, and a door for challenging Brexit has been 
left open.
The »European question« remains one of the most prob-
lematic points of policy for the Labour party, however, as is 
reflected in its ambivalent stance towards the Brexit nego-
tiations, which in turn echoes the different groupings with-
in the party. Withdrawal from the EU is portrayed as prob-
lematic for the UK – in terms of economic decline, job loss 
and reduced social protection – as well as an opportunity to 
rebuild social values on a national scale. This confusion has 
weakened Labour’s ability to hold the Conservative govern-
ment to account thus far on negotiations, and will continue 
to constitute a significant hindrance in the party’s efforts to 
strengthen its profile as a potential party of government.
THE 2017 UK GENERAL ELECTION
The 2017 General Election has been one of surprises, the 
biggest of which was that it happened in the first place. 
While the Conservative government had repeatedly said it 
did not want to call an election before its planned schedule 
in May 2020, it saw an opportunity to profit from its 
strength in the opinion polls, using the issue of Brexit to 
frame a debate that would be about leadership, in which 
Theresa May very strongly out-performed Jeremy Corbyn. 
However, campaigning proved much more volatile, as May 
appeared very unwilling to debate with either the public or 
her opponents face-to-face, while Corbyn was very clearly 
in his element, out-performing the very low expectations 
that many had of him. The rise of Labour in the opinion 
Figure 2
Spatial position and density of Labour voters
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polls appears to come partly at the expense of the Con-
servatives, with the former posed to reverse the negative 
electoral trend they experienced in the last decade. In par-
ticular, Labour has managed to lure former Liberal Demo-
cratic voters disillusioned by Lib Dems’ support for Con-
servative governments in the past. Moreover, following 
UKIP’s collapse in the polls, some former UKIP voters are 
now considering voting Labour, although most have gone 
to the Conservatives.
The second surprise was that the issue of Brexit did not 
dominate the campaign. Despite Brexit being the nominal 
justification for the election, this did not have much of a 
profile as an issue, with social policy and security playing 
much more of a role than anticipated: the latter was made 
even more important following the terrorist attacks in 
Manchester and London. Devolution has continued to 
fragment debate, with Scotland, Northern Ireland and 
Wales all being caught up in regional issues as much as na-
tional ones. This contributed to a range of policy positions 
that appears to be one of the most diverse seen in the UK 
for several decades, as both Left and Right focus on their 
core support more than the centre ground. For an under-
standing of what the most important issues in the 2017 UK 
elections were, and what were the stances of parties to-
wards these issues, see Figure 3.
MACRONISM:  
MARKET-ORIENTED PROGRESSIVISM
Although the focus of this study is on social democratic 
parties, the unprecedented electoral success of a newly es-
tablished centrist party – La République En Marche (LREM), 
whose leader was formerly a member of the French social 
democrats, merits inclusion in this research. Moreover, 
some social democratic parties (see the case of the Italian 
Partito Democratico below) have themselves adopted a 
similar strategy of moving to the political centre on the left-
right dimension, while maintaining a clear progressive 
stance on the cultural dimension. Such a strategy involves 
a party positioning on the centre to the right of centre on 
the economic dimension, while adopting staunchly pro-
gressive and pro-European stances on the cultural dimen-
sion. This entails pro-market liberalisation reforms, coupled 
with permissive stances on immigration, support for multi-
culturalism and European integration. While the strategy of 
market-oriented progressivism proved to be very electoral-
ly successful at first, in the case of Italy and France, the 
market-oriented economic reforms tend to not resonate 
well with the population at large, as citizens feel that the 
government is prioritizing the interests of big business and 
the rich at the expense of hardworking people. This has 
been reflected in France, where Macron’s ratings nose-
Figure 3
Two-dimensional political landscapes based on aggregate party placements (General elections 2017)
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dived to an all-time low, especially after the widespread 
protests of the »yellow Vests« movement in late 2018 and 
early 2019. A similar fate was bestowed upon the Italian 
social democratic PD, which lost more than 185 (62.3 per 
cent) of its seats in 2018.
France: En Marche
Macron’s new political organisation, LREM was only found-
ed in April 2016, and has crushed the two traditionally 
dominant parties in the French party system, handsomely 
winning both the presidential and parliamentary elections 
in 2017. Macron achieved this by adopting a position much 
to the right of both his core supporters (voters) and sympa-
thisers on the economic dimension. By contrast, on the cul-
tural dimension, the party is also slightly more progressive 
than many of its voters and sympathisers.
Moving to the right on the economic dimension, the char-
ismatic young former social democrat adopted social-liber-
al platform combining pro-market economic stances with 
cultural progressivism and pro-European Union attitudes. 
In light of France’s stagnating economy, Macron promoted 
labour market flexibilisation and a reduced level of social 
protection – moving away from universal rights and in the 
direction of earned rights. This position to the right of both 
most of his voters and sympathisers did not weaken his 
ability to attract voters from across the ideological spec-
trum by tapping into an anti-system sentiment (Macron 
promised to fight political corruption) and by emphasising 
labour market reform and a re-calibration of welfare ar-
rangements.
LREM ran in the 2017 legislative elections on Macron’s 
presidential manifesto in which these two issues – the 
»morality of politics« and labour market reforms – played 
an important role.
In the wake of corruption scandals embroiling the right-
wing candidate Fillion during the presidential campaign, 
Macron promised that the first bill of his newly appointed 
government would tackle the issue of transparency, fund-
ing and conflict of interest in politics. However, Macron 
and his party were in trouble almost immediately as Ma-
cron first try to appoint his wife into a formal government 
position and Richard Ferrand early advisor to Macron and 
Minister of Territorial Cohesion, came under investigation 
for conflict of interest, and had to step down from govern-
ment. Some substantive success was achieved on labour 
market reform because Macron’s LREM commanded a 
strong majority in parliament, but not in the Senate. In his 
efforts to deregulate the labour market, Macron seems to 
favour negotiations between employers and workers at 
the company level rather than at the branch or national 
level, as is currently stipulated by law. Early on, severe po-
Figure 4
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litical and social opposition emerged, against which Ma-
cron attempts to push this labour-market reform bill 
through, by means of a presidential order (»ordonnance«). 
This behaviour results in accusations by the Parti Socialiste 
and La France Insoumise of authoritarian rule by the young 
president.
Macron did deliver on his promise of renewal of the politi-
cal class: of the 461 LREM candidates almost 50 per cent 
are civil society organisation representatives, and 214 have 
never been elected to public office before (although there 
were 24 former socialist members of parliament among 
the LREM candidates). It is clear that this elite renewal is in-
sufficient to put Macron’s right-wing political economic 
agenda through parliament: there are widespread an-
ti-government protests in the streets of France by so-called 
›gilets jaunes‹ at the time of writing of this paper. Discon-
tent seems to be mostly fuelled by the high cost of living 
and the perception that Macron’s government is putting a 
disproportionate amount of the costs of the reforms on 
the working and middle class. 
STRATEGIES AND DEBATES WITHIN LREM
As with many social liberal parties, internal division within 
LREM revolve around those favouring a more pro-market 
approach to establish economic reforms that result in a 
pro-business investment climate and a more interventionist 
wing, advocating the benefits of governmental regulation 
in the economy and social investment, as means of ensur-
ing a more egalitarian society. Following his election prom-
ises, Macron took steps towards reforming the French 
economy, characterised with cumbersome labour protec-
tion legislation, high debt and exceptionally high tax rates, 
especially for the wealthiest citizens. 
Most proposals by Macron’s party did not resonate well 
with the French population, not only at the political left- 
and right-wing fringes, but much broader sections of 
French society that regard Macron as »a president of the 
rich«. Faced by widespread and publicly popular »yellow 
Vests« protests, LREM and Macron opted for a more social 
democratic approach, partly initiated by former social 
democrats within the ranks of the president’s party. Ma-
cron proposed a minimum wage increase, the cancellation 
of a planned tax increase for low-income pensioners, 
scrapping the tax on overtime work, and encouraging em-
ployers to provide tax-free end of the year bonuses. Nev-
ertheless, these measures proved insufficient in quelling 
the anger of French citizens – protests of »yellow Vests« 
continue with demands to alleviate cost and tax burdens 
on working- and middle-class citizens. However, Macron, 
loyal to his pre-election pledges, maintains that reforming 
the French economy is crucial for economic success of 
France.
Figure 5
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THE 2017 FRENCH LEGISLATIVE ELECTION 
In 2017, both presidential and parliamentary elections 
were held. In two rounds – on June 11 and 18 – French 
voters elected their members of the National Assembly. 
In the first round, the newly founded party »République 
En Marche«, of President Emmanuel Macron, reached 
over 32 per cent of the vote. Followed by »Les Républic-
ains« (21.5 per cent), the »Front National« (13.2 percent) 
and »La France Insoumise« (11 percent). The Socialist 
Party only scored 9.5 percent. Turnout was a mere 48.7 
per cent – lower than the parliamentary elections in 
2012.
Since 2002, the legislative elections are held six weeks af-
ter the Presidential elections, both taking place every five 
years. This electoral sequence was designed to re-affirm 
the centrality of the Presidential election in the French po-
litical system and to subordinate the legislative branch to 
the Presidential office, as the party of the winning presi-
dent often also wins the legislative election due to this 
temporal proximity. The aim was to avoid deadlock and en-
sure a Presidential majority in the National Assembly, as 
French Presidents have experienced three »cohabitations« 
with unsupportive National Assemblies in the 1980s and 
1990s.
The 2017 Presidential election were characterized by three 
major developments: there were a record-low number of 
votes for the candidates of traditional parties (the socialist 
Benoît Hamon and the republican François Fillon), a re-
cord-high number of voters chose radical candidates (Ma-
rine Le Pen on the extreme-right and Jean-Luc Mélenchon 
on the extreme-left), and the victory of the candidate of a 
newly established political party: Emmanuel Macron and 
his party LREM. Paradoxically, despite unprecedented elec-
toral volatility and the reshuffling of the political land-
scape, President Macron emerged with a stable parliamen-
tary majority in the National Assembly. Under the 5th 
Republic a centrist party such as LREM had never obtained 
a majority in the National Assembly. However, nowadays 
two factors play in its favour: the lower turnout in legisla-
tive elections and the fragmentation of the party system.
As in 2012, the turnout for the legislative elections was 
lower than in the Presidential election. This electoral de-
mobilization has had two consequences. On the one hand 
it has strengthened LREM, since Macron’s voters remained 
mobilized from one election to the other. On the other 
hand, participation has declined among the youth, which 
was detrimental to La France Insoumise of Mélenchon and 
to a lesser extent to the Front National of Le Pen. Both rad-
ical candidates successfully reached out to voters who did 
Figure 6
Two-dimensional political landscapes based on aggregate party placements (French legislative election 2017)
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not belong to their core group of supporters during the 
Presidential election, which is heavily personalized, and 
media-focused, but have failed to maintain this support 
during the legislative elections, due to the lower level of in-
terest displayed by voters (and journalists).
With an average of 13.6 candidates per constituency (two 
more than in 2012), the fragmentation of the party system 
is obvious, on both the left and the right. Challenger par-
ties (La République en Marche!, La France Insoumise and 
the Front National) attempted to capitalize on their favour-
able performance during the presidential elections, while 
traditional parties (Parti Socialiste, Les Républicains, Parti 
Communiste and the Greens) were on the defense aiming 
to retain their share of MPs. As a result of these dynamics, 
fewer electoral alliances emerged than in previous elec-
tions. Contrary to the Presidential election where only the 
top two contenders move to the second round, in the leg-
islative elections all candidates that obtain a score equal to 
or higher than 12.5 per cent of registered voters are al-
lowed to move to the second round. Therefore, the with-
drawing of some candidates in support of another candi-
date best ranked in the first round is a key component of 
French legislative elections. Hence, the lack of willingness 
to make electoral alliances between the parties on the left 
or between the parties on the right, and the winner take-
all logic have most likely favoured the candidates of La Ré-
publique en Marche. For an understanding of what the 
most important issues in the 2017 French legislative elec-
tion were, and what were the stances of parties towards 
these issues, see Figure 6.
Italy: Partito Democratico 
Partito Democratico (PD) steadily moved to the political 
centre throughout the 1990s. With Matteo Renzi assuming 
the party leadership in 2013, the party’s policy goals looked 
very similar to those of En Marche in France a few years lat-
er. Programmatically, the PD favoured implementing labour 
market reforms to liberalise the heavily indebted Italian 
economy. The social democrats also adopted staunchly 
pro-EU positions. At the same time, the party launched cul-
turally progressive reforms, such as the introduction of civil 
union for same-sex couples, and ensured that the Italian 
government met its international obligations in terms of ad-
mitting asylum seekers. This strategy initially worked in the 
party’s favour, as it obtained the highest proportion of the 
votes in its history in the 2013 parliamentary election and in 
the 2014 European election. Nevertheless, with relatively 
similar policy stances in 2018, the party was not successful 
in maintaining its electoral support. Many disgruntled Ital-
ian citizens deciding to vote for anti-establishment parties 
instead, in particular M5S. While the PD was initially able to 
use its ideological moderation on the left-right dimension 
and proposals for reform to appeal to broad sectors of Ital-
Figure 7
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ian society, its positioning to the right of the party’s core 
electorate proved to ultimately alienate many of its (poten-
tial) voters, who tend to have a more leftist ideological ori-
entation than what the party was willing to offer.
The PD entered the 2018 election campaign weakened by 
popular rejection of the Constitutional Reform proposed 
by party leader Matteo Renzi in a December 2016 referen-
dum. The party was also damaged by a split that took 
place in February 2017, when former party leader Pierluigi 
Bersani (under whose leadership the PD won the 2013 
elections) and his followers left the party. Although PD en-
joyed rising levels of popular support after the 2013 elec-
tions, reaching a peak in the 2014 European Elections, 
when the party obtained more than 40 per cent of the 
popular vote, this popularity proved to be short-lived. The 
PD seems to have failed in building a left-wing majority 
from the merger of Democratici di Sinistra (Left Democrats) 
and Margherita (the Daisy – left-wing Christian Demo-
crats). While many considered Renzi best equipped to lead 
the PD, he seemed unwilling to compromise with other 
wings within the party. Renzi implemented unpopular aus-
terity policies, which did not resonate well with ordinary 
Italians.
Another factor that may have contributed to the weaken-
ing of PD is the personalisation of Italian politics – political 
battles not only about substance and programmatic differ-
ences, but also about the appeal of political leaders and 
how they fare in the media. On top of that, the issues dom-
inating the public discourse were owned by the right-wing 
parties. Immigration was among the crucial and divisive is-
sues prior to the 2018 elections, and remains such until to-
day. Although Paolo Gentiloni, the prime minister who suc-
ceeded Renzi after the defeat of the 2016 referendum, 
took steps in successfully reducing immigrant inflows by 
more than 70 per cent, PD was continuously blamed for 
mass immigration and its effects on Italian society. Indeed, 
many voters blamed PD’s mixed messages on immigration 
for the ceaseless stream of asylum seekers arriving from 
the Mediterranean even though the party took serious 
measures in reducing the inflow.
Increasing public animosity towards the European Union 
has also had a negative impact on PD – one of the most 
pro-European parties on the Italian political landscape. 
While the Italian public is not that critical of the EU as a 
whole, there is widespread antipathy towards the bigger 
member states that tend to set the political and economic 
course of the EU, such as Germany and France. In particu-
lar, Italians are angry with the stringent public spending 
rules imposed by the EU which many argue are undermin-
ing the member states’ economic sovereignty.
Like in other countries, media frames also matter and opin-
ion polls play a crucial role during electoral campaigns in It-
Figure 8
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aly. As polls suggested substantial losses for the PD, the 
negative frame of the PD may have swayed voters to sup-
port other parties, regardless of ideological proximity. 
MODIFICATION OF THE PARTy’S  
IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONING
Since the merger into a left-wing bloc, the PD had difficulty 
to present a homogeneous policy-profile, due to persistent 
ideological divisions between Democratici di Sinistra and 
Margherita. Under Renzi’s leadership – from December 
2013 and again from April 2017 – the Democratic Party’s 
profile became more coherent as Renzi was able to staff the 
party with people loyal to his line. Renzi confronted the pre-
vious PD ruling elite with reforms aimed at a generational 
renovation of the party, which resulted in polarisation be-
tween the majority faction supporting Renzi, and a minority 
opposing the reform, thereby prompting the Bersani-wing 
and a number of other politicians to leave the party. Sec-
ondly, for the 2018 Elections, Renzi only put forward candi-
dates who had fully supported his agenda previously, re-
moving adversaries from the PD’s electoral lists. Moreover, 
Renzi modified the party’s ideological position, embedded 
in the cultural and political traditions of the left, by adopting 
centre-right economic policies such as tax reduction and la-
bour-market flexibilisation. The economic reforms undertak-
en by the coalition government led by Renzi from February 
2014 to December 2016 are an example of this tendency.
During the electoral campaign of 2018, PD-leaders consist-
ently highlighted the accomplishments of the PD-led coali-
tion governments (2013–2018), with strong affirmation of 
the liberal economic reforms undertaken by the Renzi Gov-
ernment. A number of culturally progressive issues – such as 
the defence of immigrants’ and homosexuals’ rights – was 
also emphasised in the 2018 manifesto. Additionally, eco-
nomic policies such as the promotion of improved working 
conditions and fresh economic support for families were im-
portant elements of the 2018 PD Campaign. Notably, the 
PD’s manifesto proposed the introduction of a basic income 
for all Italian citizens under the poverty line in response to 
Movimento 5 Stelle’s (MVS) popular proposal to introduce a 
›citizenship wage‹ for all Italians. Finally, despite Renzi’s sharp 
criticism of European governance mechanisms while heading 
the government, the 2018 PD Manifesto confirmed the par-
ty’s support for further European integration, with the ulti-
mate aim being the formation of a ›United States of Europe‹.
STRATEGIES AND DEBATES WITHIN THE PD
While many within PD which would prefer to move towards 
the left, by means of adopting a strategy of economic po-
larization, this could prove unsuccessful for 2 reasons. First, 
the policy space to the left of PD is already occupied by two 
radical left parties: Potere al Popolo and Liberi e Iguali. 
These parties already appeal to more radical left voters, and 
considering PD’s recent history of economically centrist pol-
icies, it is unlikely that the PD is able to syphon off these 
voters from the radical left. Secondly, the Italian economic 
reality – an enormous public debt coupled with a high 
budget deficit – implies that any future government would 
not be able to implement social investment policies, simply 
because there will be no money to spend. Another possible 
strategy for the party is to form or take part in an anti-pop-
ulist coalition aimed at taking down the populist govern-
ment of Lega and M5S. However, this endeavour could 
prove thoroughly unpopular, if not impossible, as it would 
require PD to join forces with parties across the political 
spectrum, including the (centre) right. A third possibility for 
PD, now that Matteo Renzi is no longer party leader, is 
forming an alliance with M5S. The left leaning populists 
have previously ruled out working with Renzi, yet now that 
this »obstacle« is out of the way, the two parties could col-
laborate. What could prove problematic here is the nature 
of the M5S electorate, which has been turning increasingly 
authoritarian and nativist, according to opinion polls. 
THE 2018 ITALIAN PARLIAMENTARy ELECTION
Compared to 2013, the 2018 election campaign began in 
a quieter and calmer economic and social context, since 
the Italian political and economic crisis was less pro-
nounced. At the start of the campaign, no event or topic 
dominated the discussion. Parties mainly competed on 
economic measures that resonate well with voters (such as 
introducing a flat tax and a basic income). However, one 
dramatic event unfolded soon after the start of the cam-
paign: on February 3, an extremist linked to the extreme 
right shot at immigrants in the town of Macerata. This rac-
ist attack, and the clashes between left- and right-wing ex-
tremists which followed, drew the political and media at-
tention of the campaign to immigration and security issues.
The campaign focus on these issues could have played a 
crucial role in the success of the right-wing populist parties, 
and especially of Lega. While in the 2013 elections, Lega 
obtained 4.08 per cent of the vote, in 2018 it became the 
biggest party of the right-wing coalition, winning a vote 
share of 17.37 per cent. To a lesser extent, Fratelli d’Italia 
also obtained a good result, expanding its vote share from 
1.95 per cent in 2013 to 4.35 per cent in 2018. In addition 
to Lega, the other big winner of the 2018 elections is M5S 
– it became the biggest party, enjoying an increase of sup-
port from 25.55 per cent in 2013 to 32.66 per cent in 2018. 
More than one third of Italian voters –especially those in 
the country’s south – opted for the populist party. Gener-
ally, the 2018 elections resulted in an upheaval of populist 
and anti-European forces.
Contrary to populists, the left coalition experienced signifi-
cant losses in popular support, with Partito Democratico 
(PD) losing more than two million votes. While in 2013 PD 
obtained 25.4 per cent of the vote, in 2018 it only won 18.7 
per cent. The implications of this result is very serious, con-
sidering that in the first elections under the leadership of 
Renzi (the 2014 European Parliament Elections), PD obtained 
40 per cent of the vote. Voters abandoning PD did not vote 
for other left-wing parties: neither smaller parties of the 
centre-left coalition, nor the radical left Potere al Popolo 
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managed to win parliamentary seats, while Liberi e Uguali 
obtained only 3.38 per cent of the popular vote. Acknowl-
edging defeat, Renzi resigned from the position of party 
leader. Forza Italia (FI) also suffered losses in the 2018 elec-
tions – the party’s vote-share declined from 21.56 per cent 
to 14.01 per cent. As a result, Berlusconi lost the leadership 
of the right-wing coalition in favour of Lega leader Matteo 
Salvini. The electoral decline of FI was compensated by Le-
ga’s good showing, which allowed the right-wing coalition 
to obtain the largest vote-share – 37 per cent of the vote.
Given these results, and the fact that no coalition obtained 
the number of seats necessary to gain a Parliamentary ma-
jority, the government formation process took a long and 
unexpected turn. Matteo Salvini (Lega) and Luigi Di Maio 
(M5S) both declared that they are ready to form political al-
liances based on the respect for their parties’ manifestos. 
Ultimately, the two populist parties formed a coalition gov-
ernment. In a nutshell, the 2018 election results produced 
the image of a divided Italy, unified only by populist an-
ti-establishment sentiments, anti-immigration rhetoric and 
unrealistic economic promises to a population that is de-
manding an end to austerity. For an understanding of what 
the most important issues in the 2018 Italian elections 
were, and what were the stances of parties towards these 
issues, see Figure 9.
PROGRESSIVE-LIBERTARIAN DISTANCING
While many observers argue that shifts along the econom-
ic dimension matter most for social democratic parties, our 
analyses clearly show that too much distancing from core 
voters on the cultural dimension entails a much greater risk 
of alienating core voter groups. In the Netherlands, the 
Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) and in France the Parti Social-
iste (PS) adopted a more progressive stance than both their 
voters and sympathisers on the cultural dimension, with 
this distancing being much most pronounced in the Neth-
erlands. Simultaneously, the parties maintained a moder-
ate, centrist position on the economic dimension. This 
combination of economic moderation with cultural pro-
gressivism cost both parties dearly in the respective parlia-
mentary elections during 2017. 
An important observation is that economic moderation 
does not seem to work if polarisation simultaneously 
takes place on the cultural dimension: PS voters and sym-
pathisers are clustered slightly towards the left of the par-
ty’s economic position, whereas PvdA’s voters and espe-
cially its sympathisers are clustered towards the right of 
the party’s position on the economic dimension. The de-
cline of PvdA and PS in national elections could have been 
caused either by failure to move sufficiently towards the 
Figure 9
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left to be recognisable by core voter or an overly extreme 
movement towards the progressive-libertarian pole, 
where other progressive challengers are already posi-
tioned. 
In contrast to the Labour Party in the UK, French and Dutch 
social democrats adopted a strategy of economic modera-
tion, while polarising on cultural issues instead. In the light 
of increased competition from anti-immigrant parties 
along with a rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment, this 
strategy did not prove successful for the two social demo-
cratic parties. Both the Dutch PvdA and French PS were 
substantially more progressive than their voters on the cul-
tural dimension, which may have caused many of their for-
mer voters to abandon these parties. It appears that PvdA 
and PS moved too far from their core electorate and as a 
result were not only unable to ›home in the base‹, but were 
also unable to successfully appeal to potential new voters. 
This proved futile, as sympathisers were positioned even 
further away from the parties.
France: Parti Socialiste 
The PS has positioned itself to the right if their voters and 
sympathisers on the economic dimension and on top of 
them in the cultural dimension. The party received the 
lowest election results in its history, lower than those of 
both its radical-left competitor La France Insoumise (Un-
submissive France), and the party of progressive newcom-
er Emmanuel Macron – LREM. The socialists simply had 
nothing to offer that would strongly distinguish them 
from the other political parties appealing to traditionally 
left-wing voters.
After holding the executive office under an unpopular 
president – Francois Hollande, PS was posed to lose, even 
though Hollande kept his pre-election promise to hike the 
tax rate to 75 per cent for the most affluent French citi-
zens. Nevertheless, considering PS’s overall moderate 
economic stances, many of its previous left-leaning voters 
opted for the radical left. Similarly, many of the more cen-
trist voters who supported the party in 2012 were attract-
ed by the pro-EU progressive messages of charismatic for-
mer social democrat Emmanuel Macron. The French 
socialists simply remained faceless for the general public 
in the light of the diverse political competition in 2017. 
Their policy preferences mirrored the ones proposed by 
Macron on the cultural dimension, while PS remained 
more moderate than their competitors on the economic 
dimension.
The PS is also in a difficult position in terms of leadership 
– the party has had a hard time putting forward charis-
matic candidates, capable of gaining votes with their per-
sonal appeal. After the end of the cold war, the tradition-
Figure 10
Spatial position and density of Parti Socialiste sympathisers
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al left in France was undermined. This allowed President 
Francois Mitterrand to steer the social democrats in a 
more social-liberal direction. However, this synthesis has 
apparently come to an end, as the living standards of the 
population stagnated and the prospects for upward social 
mobility were undermined. These conditions resulted in 
increasing scepticism towards the liberal model of so-
cio-economic governance, which has benefited radical po-
litical fringes on both the left and the right. In the light of 
the collapse of the synthesis of the social liberal wing and 
the traditional left wing within the PS, many former social 
democratic voters opted for either En Marche or La France 
Insoumise.
The shifts in its policy platform are symptomatic of the ide-
ological challenges the PS has been facing for several years. 
During the presidential campaign, PS candidate Hamon ran 
on a left-wing platform that overlapped substantially with 
that of Mélenchon, while at the same time attempts by the 
PS to re-centre itself on the economic dimension were 
challenged by Macron’s La République En Marche.
From a strategic perspective, the PS had hoped that Ma-
cron’s party would fail to obtain a majority in the National 
Assembly, thereby making the social democrats an indis-
pensable partner for voting in bills in Parliament. However, 
this best-case scenario for the Socialists failed to material-
ise, as LREM received a comfortable majority. 
Figure 11
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STRATEGIES AND DEBATES WITHIN PS
The internal debates of the direction in which the PS should 
move became evident during the 2017 election campaign, 
as the party moved to left initially, and later assumed mod-
erate, centrist stances on economic policy. Due to the very 
poor result by the PS under the leadership of Benoît Ham-
on in the 2017 presidential election (the party only ob-
tained 6.3 per cent of the vote in the first round), the Parti 
Socialiste moved away from the left-wing political line it 
had followed during the Presidential election. Hamon had 
built his manifesto around the issues of a universal income, 
labour protection, environmental protection, and a politi-
cal reorientation of the EU from within. In its platform for 
legislative elections, PS replaced its proposal for a universal 
income by a one-off EUR 10,000 grant to young adults 
while measures aimed at protecting labour, such as a robot 
tax, and recognition of job burnout (for which employees 
could have been given paid leave) were all dropped. The 
party also abandoned its plan to phase out nuclear energy, 
while with regard to EU reform, merely a proposition for 
European investment plan was made. As a result, the last 
legislative programme of the PS has been labelled »Ma-
cron-compatible« by commentators.
The PS is also divided on EU matters: the party still has not 
recovered fully from the internal split it suffered in 2005, 
when the campaign to reject the proposed European Un-
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ion constitution was spearheaded by Laurent Fabius – a 
former socialist prime minister and a major figure within 
PS. Although the »No camp« was defeated in an internal 
party vote, Fabius continued his campaigning against the 
treaty that would establish a Constitution for Europe, 
standing against the official party line. The defeat of the 
pro-EU camp in the referendum constituted the first time 
that PS was in the camp of losers on a matter of crucial im-
portance for France and Europe as a whole.
Internal debates also revolve around strategies of improv-
ing PS’s electoral performance by targeting new voter 
groups. While immigrants are clearly prospective left-wing 
voters, many in the party argue that regaining the tradi-
tional working-class vote is crucial for winning power. 
However, given its poor electoral performance, the PS will 
generally have a hard time motivating voter, since the pros-
pects of gaining power are very slim. 
Netherlands: Partij van de Arbeid
As emphasised above, the Dutch labour party PvdA adopt-
ed a centre-left stance on the economic dimension in 2017, 
coupled with a very progressive stance on the cultural di-
mension. Dutch voters on the (centre) left tend to be elec-
torally volatile, as there are many parties on the left with 
relatively similar policy positions. Particularly electoral shifts 
between the PvdA, the environmentalist GroenLinks 
(GreenLeft), and the progressive social liberals Democraten 
66 (D66) are common. In 2017, the PvdA adopted stances 
very similar to those of GreenLeft – support for the social-
ly progressive issues, multiculturalism and environmental 
protection: the social democrats are strongly in favour of 
reaching the goals of the Paris climate agreement. In addi-
tion, PvdA has been governing for 4 years in a coalition 
with the centre-right, while supporting very unpopular 
economic reforms and cuts in public expenditure. The gov-
ernment had also adopted a new labour law that proved to 
have many more negative effects than anticipated. 
However, what appears most crucial is that both voters 
and sympathisers of the Dutch social democrats are much 
more moderate than the party on the cultural dimension. 
The PvdA basically positioned itself on the fringe of its own 
voter base with regard to cultural issues. The aim of this 
strategy may have been to attract more progressive, young 
voters, the majority of whom also are considering voting 
for the GreenLeft. Obviously, this strategy of libertarian 
distancing proved unpopular among core voters, just like it 
backfired in France. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that both PS and PvdA lost voters to much more progres-
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sive parties (La France Insoumise and GroenLinks respec-
tively), so that we cannot conclude that these positions 
themselves are unpopular. It apparently is the combination 
of economic moderation with progressivism that then trig-
gers polarised competition on the cultural dimension on 
which the more radical left is seen as more credible and au-
thentic by voters. In addition, many traditional core sup-
porters of socials democrats are cultural moderates or at 
least ambivalent about issues regarding immigration. 
In the last two decades, PvdA has been facing an increasing-
ly hostile right-wing bloc of voters, pulling the party in a 
more right-wing direction economically due to the popular-
ity of the anti-immigrant political movement. For social 
democrats, the most important structural factor accounting 
for their overall weakening has been the process of »individ-
ualisation.« The »new« Left that successfully emerged in the 
1970s embraced libertarian ideas and, soon enough, many 
elements of this »liberalisation of the individual« became 
part and parcel of social democratic party platforms as well. 
This led to a deep fundamental ideological crisis for Dutch 
social democrats, as the notion of free, individual choice un-
dermined the traditional drivers of left-wing thinking: soli-
darity and state interventionism. A mixture of libertarian 
views of societal relations with a statist view of economics 
was untenable. This ideological shift empowered right-wing 
conservatives, who had always preferred individuals assum-
ing responsibility for their own lives to submitting to public 
arrangements, and beginning at this point they no longer 
faced an ideological challenge to that idea. Individualisation 
not only undermined the ideological thrust of the PvdA – 
coupled with the professionalisation and personalisation of 
politics it also eroded class identities. The social democrats 
could no longer politicise the class struggle and economical-
ly emancipate the working classes, as the latter had partial-
ly dissipated through upward social mobility, while the rem-
nants had fragmented in terms of ethnic background 
(immigrants), age (pension-less elderly), and labour-market 
position (the working poor, flex-workers and illegal labour-
ers). PvdA had to grapple with the loss of core ideological 
concepts and core supporters, forcing the party to reorient 
itself ideologically and electorally in the face of a growing 
popularity of liberal and conservative ideas. Popular support 
for social and economic state interventionism was further 
undermined. The end of the cold war plunged the PvdA 
even more deeply into an existential crisis. Now that large-
scale state interventionism had been discredited, the social 
democrats reoriented themselves toward liberalism and de-
veloped the »Third Way« ideology. While the name does not 
necessarily acknowledge a hierarchical status below that of 
conservatism and liberalism, the result was nevertheless a 
further de-legitimisation of left-wing politics and statist in-
terventionism. This was exemplified in the 2017 election – 
the Dutch social democrats received their hardest blow to 
date, with their core electorate shifting on a massive scale 
towards progressive parties that attach less importance to 
Figure 13
Spatial position and density of Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA) sympathisers
© Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung
25FOUR STRATEGIES OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES
economic policy. The PvdA has adopted a stance of compe-
tition for the left-wing vote, rather than focusing on the ex-
posure of the detrimental effects of austerity brought about 
by the right. As a viable governing party, the Dutch social 
democrats actually supported an array of centre-right poli-
cies which, in the eyes of many voters, constituted a betray-
al of the core tenets of social justice, in the defence of which 
the party campaigned in 2012. This caused confusion in the 
eyes of many left-wing voters, who abandoned PvdA in 
2017 to support other progressive and left-wing parties. 
Since PvdA was a minority coalition partner, it was unable to 
impress voters with their contribution and their ability to 
keep their right-wing coalition partner in check. Many cen-
tre and left-wing voters could not distinguish what policy is-
sues the social democrats wanted to address and what 
moderating effect they had – if any – on the economic pol-
icies of their senior coalition partner. At the local level PvdA 
is also part of numerous left-wing municipal coalitions, 
which makes it more difficult for citizens to distinguish the 
differences between parties on the left. In 2017, voters ar-
guably no longer had a clear idea of what the party stood 
for economically, after supporting austerity measures be-
tween 2012 and 2017. Moreover, the pro-EU and culturally 
progressive stance of the PvdA was not unique and similar 
positions were held by other parties that were untainted by 
government participation. Another problem facing the Pv-
dA is ageing of its electorate – the social democrats rely pre-
dominantly on the older cohorts of the Dutch electorate, 
Figure 14
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and are most popular among voters over the age of 60. 
Even though younger, left-leaning voters are supportive of 
policies proposed and implemented by the PvdA, many are 
unaware or unable to see the achievements of social demo-
crats (such as consumer, workers’ and tenants’ rights, wel-
fare arrangements, public transport and other public servic-
es). Especially young voters do not attribute these policies to 
the social democrats.
STRATEGIES AND DEBATES WITHIN PVDA
As is the case for most Western European Social Democrat-
ic parties, internal debates revolve mainly around the party 
profile with regard to economic policy. Some within the 
PvdA favour a more economically polarizing strategy and 
push for closer collaboration between the social democrats 
and more left-leaning opposition parties, such as the So-
cialistische Partij (SP). GroenLinks is not always more to the 
left and sometimes even more in favour of reform than the 
social democrats, making collaboration far from automat-
ic. However, of all the left-wing parties, only the PvdA has 
been in government, which is why others in the PvdA fear 
that to close association with the radical left and progres-
sives would render the party less governmental. Since 
there is no chance of a left-wing majority in the Nether-
lands, the more pragmatic wing strongly favours a centrist 
economic platform.
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Despite of PvdA’s tremendous electoral loss in 2017, some 
of its members and leadership representatives were in fa-
vour of the party joining the coalition formation talks, after 
receiving an invitation from previous coalition partner 
VVD. However, the voters’ verdict made a role as opposi-
tion more logic. At the same time, the size of the party en-
tails the risk of becoming politically irrelevant and obsolete.
THE 2017 DUTCH GENERAL ELECTION
The Dutch parliamentary election took place on the March 
15, 2017. Incumbent Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s party 
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) became 
the largest party, despite dramatic losses, obtaining with 
21.2 per cent of the vote. The radical populist right Party 
for Freedom (PVV) of Geert Wilders won 13 per cent, the 
Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) 12.4 per cent, Demo-
crats 66 gained 12.2 per cent, the Socialist party 9.1 per 
cent and the GreenLeft achieved 9.1 per cent. The social 
democratic PvdA received 5.7 per cent – the lowest result 
in the party’s history.
The campaign preceding the 2017 election was marked by 
deep political polarization, particularly on cultural issues 
that benefitted the traditional right-wing parties. Issues 
like immigration and integration dominated the public de-
bate, making it hard for parties on the left to get their mes-
sage across. A media-fabricated horse-race between the 
VVD and the anti-immigrant party PVV sucked all media 
attention towards these two parties, even though no par-
ty would govern with Wilders. As a result of PVV’s good 
showing in the polls, several other parties adopted more 
stringent anti-immigration and EU-critical stances. Particu-
larly the VVD, CDA and SGP (a small religious party) were 
mimicking Wilders anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rheto-
ric. The VVD even took a page-wide message in all major 
newspapers to »all Dutch citizens« to »act normal or 
leave.« Also, on the left, the SP voiced strong opposition to 
labour migration from newer eastern-EU member-states. 
The PvdA had stressed that the EU should guarantee that 
there is »equal pay for equal work« within its borders, or 
dismantle the common labour market, but this sounded 
half-hearted compared to all the anti-immigration political 
fireworks. The PVV did not come even close win the elec-
tions and would never govern, but was able to capture and 
dominate the public debate – even as Wilders hardly cam-
paigned and the party’s manifesto was one page long, 7 
bullet point piece of paper.
More than four years earlier, the 2012 elections resulted in 
a coalition between PvdA and VVD. While the liberals man-
Figure 15
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aged to limit its losses and achieve the highest proportion 
of popular support – holding on to 33 of their 41 seats – the 
social democrats lost 29 of their 38 seats. The PvdA ended 
up with less than 6 percent of the vote and only 9 seats, 
which is by far the lowest proportion the social democrats 
obtained in the post-war period. Many of its previous sup-
porters became disillusioned with the party’s concessions 
to its right-wing coalition partner. Since 2012 the coalition 
government introduced cuts to welfare entitlements for the 
unemployed and the disabled and transformed a 
long-standing universal student grant into a loan system. In 
addition, the government relaxed the rules for firing em-
ployees, introduced a step-wise pension age increase and 
reduced state funding for elderly care homes, as well as 
budget cuts in care and work-experience programs for dis-
abled people. Disillusioned with such policies, many left-
wing voters abandoned the PvdA, opting for competitors 
to the left and even the centre-right. Overall, parties on the 
left received the lowest combined support since 1945. The 
decline of the social democrats already became evident in 
2014, when PvdA suffered heavy losses in municipal elec-
tions and was ousted from office in the Amsterdam munic-
ipality for the first time in the post-war period.
The withering away of support for the PvdA in 2017 bene-
fitted several other parties, with more progressive voters 
overwhelmingly migrating to the GL, which gained 10 
seats, to a total of 14; traditional leftists migrating to the 
Socialist Party (SP, but in turn this party also lost one seat) 
and centrist voters migrating to the social liberal D66 and 
also CDA. Overall, the combined left (PvdA, SP and GL) lost 
20 seats. For an understanding of what the most impor-
tant issues in the 2017 Dutch elections were, and what 




In Austria and Sweden, social democratic parties have 
largely stuck to a catch-all strategy of moderation and cen-
trism on both the economic and cultural issue-dimension. 
Actual voters of the SPÖ (Sozialdemokratische Partei Öster-
reichs) and SAP (Sveriges socialdemokratiska arbetareparti) 
appear to be more culturally conservative than sympathis-
ers of these parties. On the economic dimension, both vot-
ers and sympathisers are slightly to the right of the respec-
tive social democratic parties. Austrian and Swedish social 
democrats have adopted moderate rather than radical pol-
icy proposals enabling them to reach out to both the (au-
thoritarian / conservative) working class and lower mid-
dle-class voters. By adopting a position in between that of 
their core voters and the base of more progressive sympa-
thisers, they appeal to a broad section of the population. In 
the case of Sweden and Austria, social democratic parties 
also adopted mild anti-immigrant stances in light of the 
rise of anti-immigrant parties. Pragmatic stances, in terms 
of both economic governance and cultural issues, allows 
social democrats to easily enter coalition negotiations with 
ideologically dissimilar parties on the political centre. 
In these countries, social democratic sympathisers are 
more culturally progressive than the party stance, and 
place themselves slightly to the right of the parties on the 
economic dimension. This indicates that by adopting a tra-
ditional catch-all strategy, social democratic parties are 
able to appeal to both the more conservative sectors of the 
working class as well as progressive intellectuals, profes-
sionals and the middle class.
Austria: Sozialdemokratische 
Partei Österreichs
Despite failing to increase its vote share in the 2017 elec-
tions, the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) remains 
one of the major actors in the Austrian party system. The 
party managed to successfully attain an appeal across so-
cial classes during the 1970s, and despite of the conserva-
tive majority in parliament was a dominant coalition part-
ner in alternating government coalitions: the SPÖ-FPÖ 
governments between 1986 and 1990 and the SPÖ-ÖVP 
during the 1990s. After spending two terms in the opposi-
tion, the party regained the chancellorship in 2006, form-
ing two consecutive coalition governments with ÖVP 
which lasted until May 2017.
Only one and a half years after heading the Austrian gov-
ernment, the position of SPÖ, with Chancellor Werner Fay-
mann at its helm, was weakened by the substantial elector-
al gains by the centre-right ÖVP and the radical right FPÖ. 
Already in 2013, the Austrian election produced all-time 
lows for both mainstream parties, the SPÖ and ÖVP. Still, 
they secured a combined majority by a tiny margin and 
managed to form a coalition government. After a period of 
favourable mid-year performance in the polls, the SPÖ fell 
behind the conservative ÖVP in popularity, only obtaining 
one more seat than the anti-immigrant FPÖ in the 2017 
elections. The 2017 elections were marked by the pro-
nounced saliency of the immigration issue: the centre-right 
ÖVP moved further to the right and put emphasis on criti-
cising immigration, without losing any voters. At the same 
time, support for the social democrats stagnated, which in-
dicates that cultural issues – in particular immigration – is a 
real obstacle for left-wing parties if they want to address 
economic concerns.
The Austrian social democrats ran a traditional campaign 
focussing on socio-economic issues such as labour protec-
tion and tax reductions for lower-income persons. Amongst 
others, the SPÖ proposed an increase in pensions, intro-
duction of a nation-wide minimum wage, and measures to 
create jobs. In addition to introducing an inheritance tax, 
the Austrian social democrats are in favour of introducing 
a levy on value-added taxes as a means to continue to fund 
the welfare state. To curb a weakening electoral perfor-
mance among traditional supporters and to expand the 
voters base beyond older generations of voters, the SPÖ 
proposed several policies to help younger generations find 
employment, housing and affordable education. Christian 
Kern, when leading the party, proposed a cap on rents to 
keep (social) housing affordable. With regard to cultural is-
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sues, the Austrian Social Democrats combine progressive 
and conservative views. They are in favour of same-sex 
marriage, are in favour of measures to increase social 
equality and prevent gender discrimination. The party’s 
emphasis on socially progressive issues has managed to at-
tract the support of some former Green voters, while alien-
ating more traditional supporters among the working 
class, who switched to the radical populist right FPÖ.
One stance that could be considered conservative/tradi-
tionalist, however, is the unwillingness of the SPÖ to intro-
duce legislation that would make it possible for immigrants 
to obtain dual citizenship. This example illustrates the SPÖ’s 
increased focus on domestic issues with a populist tenden-
cy, thereby opening the door to the possibility of a govern-
ment coalition with the right-wing-populist party FPÖ. In 
June 2017, the Austrian social democrats announced that 
they would be dropping their 30-year refusal to negotiate 
with the FPÖ.
STRATEGIES AND DEBATES WITHIN SPÖ
The divisions within SPÖ have traditionally revolved around 
the party’s economic policy. After employing a Keynesian 
strategy throughout the 1970s, SPÖ was posed to change 
its economic governance in the early 1980, when issues 
with this strategy became visible (rising national debt and 
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structural economic problems), while the public budget 
has dwindled and macro-economic indicators were point-
ing to serious economic issues. The social democrats were 
forced to choose between Keynesianism or deregulation. 
The former involved promoting special economic pro-
grammes of employment through nationalised firms, justi-
fied by the argument that unemployment is costlier, con-
sidering that it brings decreased tax revenue and lower 
consumption. Conversely, SPÖ could opt for a formula of 
developing the economy through supply-side entailing the 
privatisation of previously nationalised firms. In 1986, the 
party went for the latter, moving away from Keynesianism, 
to subsidising key economic sectors and private employers, 
while introducing special employment training programs 
targeting the youth and women. 
By the late 1990s, SPÖ had new employment and econom-
ic policies: labour market flexibility, focus on the competi-
tiveness of private enterprises and economic deregulation. 
Instead of a Keynesian, collectivist approach to employ-
ment, supply-side measures which come from an individu-
alistic perspective, where the state aims to create the most 
efficient conditions for employability. 
While the party has maintained more pragmatic and eco-
nomically centrist positions, there are internal voices willing 
to set the sail in a more radical direction. However, the cur-
rent internal debates in SPÖ revolve more around non-eco-
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nomic policy, and mainly on the issue of whether the par-
ty should adopt a more reconciliatory approach towards 
the FPÖ. Considering the rightward shift in public opinion, 
some argue that this could be the only avenue for the so-
cial democrats to come in power again. 
THE 2017 AUSTRIAN LEGISLATIVE ELECTION
Austria was characterised by a stable party system domi-
nated by two major parties during the postwar era – the 
Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian 
People’s Party (ÖVP). Lately, the Social Democrats re-
mained in the opposition for two terms until 2006, when 
the party regained the chancellorship and formed two con-
secutive coalition governments with the ÖVP which lasted 
until May 2017.
As a result of the collapse of the Grand Coalition (of SPÖ-
ÖVP), Austrian parliamentary elections took place premature-
ly on October 15, 2017. While support for the SPÖ remained 
stable, the ÖVP and the FPÖ each gained substantially in the 
elections. Considering the collapse of Team Stronach and the 
Greens, this result is not impressive. It is also worth noting 
that, not long ago, the left and progressive forces were able 
to rally behind a presidential candidate from the Greens, 
while now the left has a combined tally of just over 30 per-
cent of the votes. Due to the four per cent electoral thresh-
old, (re-)entry into parliament proved impossible for the 
Greens that split, with the ›personalised‹ Liste Pilz – a break-
away from the Greens – entering parliament with 8 seats. 
Even though the conservative-liberal camp in Austrian poli-
tics has seen constant rumble since the 1990s, with several 
breakaways from the FPÖ gaining, the two right-wing parties 
easily found common ground after the 2017 elections oust-
ing the social democrats from national power.
Inside the SPÖ there were conflicts right from the begin-
ning of the 2017 election campaign. Due to the premature 
termination of the Grand Coalition, several social demo-
crats speculated on possible coalition variants in the media 
before the actual election outcome, making the party look 
power-hungry rather than interested in bringing their case 
to the people. Core social democratic socio-economic is-
sues were raised by SPÖ-chancellor Christian Kern but 
were pushed into the background by early speculations of 
possible successors and discussions about other regional 
politicians. While incumbency can be an asset, the sitting 
chancellor was overshadowed by the media performance 
of the ÖVP-leader Sebastian Kurz, who completely 
switched to an anti-immigration rhetoric and did not de-
fend the policies of the previous government in which SPÖ 
and ÖVP were coalition partners. For an understanding of 
what the most important issues in the 2017 Austrian elec-
tions were, and what were the stances of parties towards 
these issues, see Figure 15.
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Sweden: Sveriges Socialdemokratiska 
Arbetareparti
For the Swedish Social Democrats (SAP), a strong, regulat-
ed labour market and universal access to health-care and 
education remain important political issues. As an effect 
of gradual individualisation and globalisation of society 
since the 1990s, social democracy in Sweden has been 
suffering from an »identity crisis« and an erosion of the 
traditionally stable working-class voter base. Nevertheless, 
remaining the largest party in the last election, Swedish 
Social Democrats are far from being on their knees. Social 
democracy is in many ways an entrenched part of the 
Swedish political infrastructure, as the party ruled without 
interruption for four decades between the 1930s and the 
1970s, to a large extent shaping Swedish political culture 
in the 20th century.
During the last two decades, the Swedish Social Demo-
crats have been confronted with increasing polarisation of 
the political landscape and a strong right-wing bloc that is 
pushing for further tax cuts and increasing privatisation of 
welfare services. The growth of the nationalist anti-immi-
gration party, Sweden Democrats (SD), has further shifted 
the political debate away from classical social democratic 
issues and reinforced the feeling of a social democracy in 
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crisis. This situation has led to decreasing support for the 
party in parliamentary elections and a loss of many of its 
voters. With 31 per cent of the votes in the 2014 election, 
SAP remained the largest party, an achievement that was 
repeated in 2018. In fact, now the lead over the second 
and third largest parties, (M and SD respectively) actually 
increased despite the social democrats losing around 3 
percent of their support.
The shift in the public debate towards a greater emphasis 
on migration issues and law and order is not to the advan-
tage of the social democrats. The party is attempting a 
high-wire act, trying to find a balance between continued 
focus on welfare and labour issues, in which SAP tradition-
ally enjoys considerable support from voters, while seeking 
to establish a strong profile on immigration issues as well 
as law and order, which are of major importance to their 
constituency and the public debate in general. The social 
democrats’ immigration policy was reversed in 2015, in the 
wake of the European »refugee crisis«. The government 
toughened the rules, underscoring the need for domestic 
order and stability and reintroducing border controls. This 
policy shift was unprecedented, especially since only a few 
years ago party leader Stefan Löfven was pushing for a lib-
eral migration policy and »rejection« of the SD’s attempt to 
control the political agenda by whipping up nationalist 
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sentiments. Although this new policy has not made the 
party grow, it has taken root and can be seen as a reaction 
to the increasing popularity of the SD.
STRATEGIES AND DEBATES WITHIN SAP
Considering the widespread public approval of the »Swed-
ish model« which entails numerous policies introduced by 
the social democrats, the internal debates within SAP re-
volve around economic policy, even though the party has 
been moving to the political centre since the 1990s. Never-
theless, even the main parties of the centre-right have em-
braced the Swedish model of relatively high taxation, an 
active role of the state in the national economy and gener-
ous welfare state arrangements. The right wants lower tax-
ation, further privatizations, and to introduce larger salary 
discrepancies, but are limited by the popularity of the rela-
tively well-functioning welfare state in Sweden. Despite 
long-term social democratic rule there has been a steady 
rise of income inequality since the early 2000s, fuelling so-
cial discontent. 
Debates within the SAP during much of 2017 revolved 
around the shape and content of political alliances and co-
alition formation. Witnessing the decline of bloc politics, 
fuelled by the rise of populism, some within SAP advocate 
for a cross-ideological cooperation between the centre-left 
and the centre-right. Moderate political parties have all re-
fused to collaborate with the Sweden Democrats, and 
were forced to collaborate across blocks after the 2018 
elections. Until September 2018, social democratic Prime 
Minister Stefan Löfven was co-governing with the Green 
Party (MP) and relied on the parliamentary support of the 
radical left party Vänsterpartiet. The current Swedish cabi-
net relies on the parliamentary support Centerpartiet (C) or 
Liberalerna (L) – a development which signifies the decline 
of bloc politics. 
The issue of immigration has also become central in the era 
of growing populist sentiments. In early 2018 SAP joined 
the parties of the right-wing »Alliance« bloc to announce 
that ›integration‹ is the main issue facing the country. It 
seemed as if the social democrats and the right-wing polit-
ical bloc were competing with each other to portray them-
selves as the political movement best placed to tackle it. 
This path seemed as if the whole party system was playing 
on the home turf of the anti-immigrant far right, as all par-
ties seemed to converge on the same issue. Naturally, this 
benefited the Sweden Democrats. Later in 2018, facing a 
surge of the Sweden Democrats in the polls, SAP changed 
its strategy and started arguing that the 2018 elections 
were essentially about welfare provision and social policy. 
With the advance of the campaign, SAP embraced more 
leftist proposals, announcing plans to raise taxes on private 
companies and to increase various social benefits. This 
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strategy seems to have worked in the party’s favour, as it 
received more votes than opinion polls were predicting. 
The adoption of different strategies during the electoral 
campaign suggests that there are multiple currents within 
SAP, each advocating the adoption of a different vote-max-
imisation strategy.
THE 2017 SWEDISH GENERAL ELECTION
On September 9, 2018, Swedish citizens cast their vote in 
a parliamentary election. The 349 seats in the Riksdag – 
the Swedish parliament – are distributed proportionally. 
During the previous election in 2014, eight parties passed 
the four-percent parliamentary threshold. The biggest 
party, Socialdemokraterna, formed a red-green minority 
government with the Green Party, Miljöpartiet, that relies 
on the support of the Left Party, Vänsterpartiet. To ena-
ble the government to get its budget plans through, and 
to prevent a crisis after the 2014 election, the ruling par-
ties had to also reach an agreement with the right-wing 
»Alliance« parties due to the position of Sverigedemokra-
terna.
Opinion polls indicate that the issues considered most 
important by Swedish citizens in the 2018 elections were 
healthcare, immigration and law and order. Issues that 
have received little media coverage are EU cooperation, 
economic policy and gender equality. Analysts seem to 
agree that »softer« issues have now given way to »hard 
issues« such as law & order, which dominates the politi-
cal discourse as it does in most other European coun-
tries.
Swedish politics is marked by four distinct characteristics. 
First, it is characterized with high voter turnout (85.8 per 
cent in the 2014 election and 87.1 percent in 2018) and a 
relatively stable political culture (for example, there has 
not been any snap election in Sweden since 1958). Sec-
ond, the social democratic movement and social demo-
cratic party has traditionally been so strong that it gov-
erned without interruption for four decades between the 
1930s and the 1970s. Third, the political structure is 
marked by »bloc politics«: parties in parliament have cre-
ated two relatively stable alliances, recently with three 
red-red-green parties on the left, pitted against four cen-
tre-right parties on the right (M, L, C, KD). In 2004, the 
right »bloc« formed an official strategic cooperation, »the 
Alliance«, which later formed a coalition government. 
Fourth, in 2010, the right-wing populist party Sver-
igedemokraterna (SD) entered parliament and reshaped 
the political landscape. Their presence added a new di-
mension to the political landscape and loosened the ties in 
the left and right blocs. The increased vote and seat share 
of the Sweden Democrats resulted in an unprecedented 
political deadlock in 2018: none of the two blocks man-
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aged to obtain a parliamentary majority, while both re-
fused to rely on the support of the radical populist right. 
The government formation process was extremely lengthy 
and difficult for Swedish standards: after several failed at-
tempts of SAP and M to form a centre-left and centre-right 
coalition governments respectively, a government was fi-
nally formed in January 2019 after the Social Democrats 
struck an agreement with the Greens, the Liberals, and 
the Centre Party. For an understanding of what the most 
important issues in the 2018 Swedish elections were, and 
what were the stances of parties towards these issues, see 
Figure 21.
Figure 21
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THE FINDINGS IN A NUTSHELL
The analyses and trends outlined above show that Europe-
an social democratic parties adopt profoundly different 
electoral strategies: they employ very different political 
narratives and adopt distinctive policy stances, as they 
need to adapt to the national political environment and 
specific necessities of party competition in their respective 
countries. However, when we group social democratic par-
ties by electoral strategy, a pattern of similar outcomes in 
electoral performance emerges: in both France and the 
Netherlands, the strategy of libertarian distancing was dis-
astrous for the social democratic parties that followed it, 
while in Austria and Sweden economic centrism and cul-
tural moderation guaranteed that the vote shares for social 
democracy would remain stable or decline less sharply. In 
Italy, the strategy of combining pro-market economic poli-
cies with cultural progressivism proved very successful at 
first, but public approval for the party that advocated it 
quickly dwindled, much like what happened with En 
Marche led by Macron in France. The only strategy that 
successfully expanded the voter base for social democrats 
is the one of economic polarisation employed by British La-
bour, although one has to consider that Labour has previ-
ously experienced a sharp electoral decline, and that many 
voters doubt the party’s competence to govern the coun-
try, even though Labour’s radical rhetoric and public image 
is not matched by its actual party platform. 
SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC STRATEGIES  
IN DETAIL
From this assessment of the relative positioning of social 
democratic parties vis-à-vis their core voter groups, we can 
conclude that two strategies seem to have been most ben-
eficial in terms of electoral appeal: a traditional social-dem-
ocratic catch-all strategy of moderation along both the 
economic and cultural dimensions (as used by SPÖ and 
SAP) as well as a strategy of polarisation along the eco-
nomic dimension – Corbynism – by adopting clear left-
wing stances (as the British Labour Party has done). The 
catch-all strategy appears to be more defensive and has 
ensured electoral stability, yet with some decline of the so-
cial democratic vote share in Sweden and a marginal gain 
in Austria. The strategy of economic polarisation seems to 
be best posed to expand electoral support for the social 
democrats. As the case of the PS under Hamon shows, 
however, is that a leftward movement only seems to work 
when social democrats do not adopt too progressive posi-
tion on the cultural dimension, compared to core voter 
groups. The most toxic strategy, in terms of electoral per-
formance, appears to be economic moderation coupled 
with cultural polarisation by moving the party to the pro-
gressive / libertarian pole, as the Dutch PvdA did in the 
2017 elections (support plummeting from 24.7 per cent in 
2012 to 5.7 per cent in 2017).
Corbynism has proven largely successful in expanding 
UK’s Labour party voting share in 2017, yet the party is still 
to win a general election. Economic polarisation can be po-
tentially successful in situations with prolonged (centre-) 
right rule, where austerity policies have been so overreach-
ing that they affect the general public at large. In the UK, 
the healthcare and public transportation system, but also 
the police and numerous other institutions have been sub-
jected to years of budget cuts. In such a situation, faced 
with the negative effects of austerity, the general public, as 
well as government employees and public servants often 
turn against right-wing parties. Nevertheless, social demo-
crats should be wary that moving too far to the left might 
make a political party seem incompetent in the eyes of 
moderate, centrist voters. In the case of Labour, the pre-
sumed incompetency of the party leadership is seen as a 
major barrier preventing the party from leading decisively 
in the polls. Nevertheless, this is a matter of speculation, 
since the party could have been in even less advantageous 
situation with a more moderate leadership.
Macronism also appears to be a successful strategy, at 
least initially. By moving towards the ideological centre and 
adopting an orthodox economic strategy, while pledging 
to reform the Italian economy, Partito Democratico man-
aged to successfully appeal to a wide range of voters and 
win the 2013 election.  Similarly, creating En Marche prior 
to the 2017 French elections, Emmanuel Macron gained 
control of both the presidency and the legislative assembly. 
Nevertheless, adopting a Macronist strategy could prove 
detrimental in the long run. After expanding its share of 
seats in 2013, support for the Italian social democrats de-
clined sharply in 2018 (from 25.4 to 18.7 percent), even 
though the party maintained its pro-market economic 
stance. Similarly, after his resounding victory in 2017, Ma-




year after the start of his presidency, indicating that the 
success of his political project will be at stake in the next 
elections. Among the main criticisms (left-leaning) voters 
have of Macron is that his policies benefit wealthy business 
elites at the expense of working people. Thus, he is increas-
ingly perceived as a »president of the rich«. Social demo-
cratic parties should therefore be wary of adopting a 
Macronism strategy, which may have short-term electoral 
benefits, but basically constitutes an abandonment of cen-
tre-left social democratic core values and policies.
What appears to be a toxic mix for social democrats is eco-
nomic moderation combined with a polarisation on the 
cultural dimension (a strategy adopted by PvdA and PS). In 
the eyes of voters, this progressive libertarian distanc-
ing creates an indistinguishable profile of the parties that 
adopt such a strategy – their policy proposals become al-
most identical to those of other progressive competitors. 
On the economic dimension, moderation only works when 
the centre-left also remains moderate on the cultural di-
mension. A combination of economic centrism and cultur-
al distancing towards the progressive pole makes social 
democrats indistinguishable from the centre-right on eco-
nomic issues, while blurring their differences with green 
parties and other progressive competitors. Social democra-
cy seems to have much more room to manoeuvre along 
the economic dimension (most beneficially to the left), 
while movement along the cultural dimension – particular-
ly towards the progressive pole – seems to sever links with 
core groups of voters on a serious scale without enabling 
social democrats to appeal to new voter groups.
What appears to work best in the long run for social dem-
ocratic parties, at least with regard to remaining electoral-
ly strong, is employing a catch-all strategy in an attempt 
to appeal to as wide sectors of the population as possible. 
This strategy entails the maintenance of a vision of govern-
ability, as catch-all parties are often government incum-
bents (as is still the case in Sweden and was the case in 
Austria until 2018). Catch-all parties have traditionally em-
braced both economic and ideological moderation, ap-
pealing to an expanding middle class with a vision of sta-
bility and prosperity. Instead of pushing for radical 
economic changes, these parties remain proponents of 
maintaining the status quo in terms of welfare provision 
and oppose the dismantling of social safety nets and fur-
ther pro-business economic liberalisation. When it comes 
to identity politics, catch-all parties retain a progressive 
stance, without jumping on the bandwagon of identity 
politics by putting too much emphasis on, for instance, 
ethnic and sexual minority rights. 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF  
POLITICAL COMPETITION
In the era of populist mobilisation, there is clearly a reconfig-
uration of the most salient issue-dimensions that structure 
European party competition. Traditionally, party competi-
tion in European countries is multidimensional, with an eco-
nomic issue-dimension as the most salient – although the 
number and saliency of cleavages widely varies across party 
systems. Particularly during the first decades of reconstruc-
tion in the post-war period, party competition was strongly 
oriented toward economic issues such as employment, tax-
ation, wages, and the development of the welfare state. In 
addition, moral-religious issues have always remained im-
portant in the minds of voters and party leaders, who can 
broadly be differentiated between more conservative-or-
thodox-nationalist positions versus more progressive-per-
missive-cosmopolitan stances. Previous research has found 
that this cultural dimension also separates those who favour 
an open and multicultural society from those who favour a 
more exclusive community by means of curbing immigra-
tion. It is this debate on (labour) immigration, refugees and 
European integration that has transformed the configura-
tion of the dimensional space in European democracies. 
Since the 1960s, another set of issues related to libertarian 
and lifestyle issues (regarding sexuality, partnerships and 
drugs) as well as environmentalism had also gained saliency 
for voters. All these new issues did not add any fundamen-
tally new dimension or replaced existing ones, but merely 
transformed the meaning of the two already existing di-
mensions that make up the political European space. Essen-
tially, the cleavage structure in European countries can be 
reduced to two dimensions of conflict: an economic conflict 
over distributional preferences, reflecting a divergence of 
objective material interests; and a cultural political conflict 
informed by fundamental value divides (e. g. religiosity vs. 
secularism). However, a closer examination, based on new 
evidence, shows otherwise. Both the content and structure 
of issue dimensions has transformed.
In this re-articulation of the political space on both eco-
nomic and cultural dimensions, we see that authoritarian 
nativists are increasingly pitted against progressive univer-
salists. The post-war social pact of the major political par-
ties – promising universalistic welfare arrangements and 
economic growth with a fair amount of social economic 
redistribution – is no longer viable. This pact between the 
lower and middle classes, in which the latter accepted rel-
ative high levels of taxation in exchange for a good educa-
tional system to achieve upward social mobility for their 
offspring is undermined by globalised financial capital and 
a reduced capacity of governments to shield social groups 
from economic fluctuations and accompanying hardship 
and crises. Large scale immigration undermined the social 
contract as the composition of the lower classes was trans-
formed and newcomers are increasingly seen as ›undeserv-
ing‹. This sentiment also diminishes the level of solidarity 
felt by the middle classes, reducing their willingness to pay 
for universal welfare state arrangements. Social programs 
subsequently became less generous and were re-organ-
ized into more opportunity-centred provisions, aimed at 
activating the unemployed and preparing them for re-en-
try into the labour market. This re-commodification means 
that the lower and middle classes are only given minimal 
income securities in times of unemployment and ill-health 
at best, and broad sections of society have become much 
more precarious. Both the ethno-stratification of the work-
ing-class and the fragmentation of the middle classes, 
combined with a broad sense that economic prosperity is 
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less secure, has transformed socio-economic and political 
attitudes. A more ›nativist‹ attitude is visible among large 
sections of the electorate, who believe that social benefits 
should be based on contribution and merit, rather than on 
automatic, universal entitlements. 
The increased salience of cultural issues related to immigra-
tion and asylum, social and economic integration of mi-
grants, Islam and religion, racism and EU integration trans-
formed party competition in European democracies. 
Recent academic research shows that, next to the ›old cul-
tural dimension‹ related to religion and moral issues, the 
opinion structure of voters culminated in a new cultural di-
mension that pits defenders of the national interest and 
national identity against cosmopolitans who are more 
comfortable with multiculturalism and more fluid identi-
ties. Combined with this nationalist outlook in life are au-
thoritarian and anti-elite tendencies, including a strong 
preference for majoritarian direct democracy instruments, 
strict law-and-order and the de-funding of public cultural 
institutions (like public broadcasters). This nationalistic 
worldview is juxtaposed against voters and politicians with 
a more internationalist, libertarian and pluralistic outlook, 
which has become closely connected with environmental-
ism and a tendency to support public funding of cultural 
institutions.
The economic dimension has fractured as well. Non-eco-
nomic issues began to blend into this new line of conflict, 
voter and party positions on economic issues became 
structured into two separate economic dimensions. In ad-
dition to the traditional economic dimension that focuses 
on redistribution and egalitarianism, a second economic di-
mension has emerged in the minds of voters that incorpo-
rates issues like welfare state reform, dividing those want 
to have a more limited healthcare and social security sys-
tem aiming at cost control, long-term sustainability and in-
dividual responsibility versus those who reject reform and 
want to maintain a more generous healthcare system 
based on current needs, even If this means increased 
spending. Needless to say, this reconfiguration of the di-
mensional issue space in European democracies, whereby 
the two cultural dimensions now override the old and new 
economic issue dimensions, also means that political com-
petition, as well as party systems have been transformed 
(see Figure 22).
The graphs clearly show this tilting of party competition, 
with red lines showing traditional axes of party competi-
tion and black lines the mutation of the direction of party 
competition. If we look at France for example, traditional 
competition during the Fifth Republic was mainly between 
a progressive-left (comprised of the PS and various com-
munist and radical parties) and a conservative right, rally-
ing around the ideological heritage of Gaullism. In the 
2017 election, however, the main competitors were a right-
wing and progressive En Marche led by Macron that was 
opposed by a left-leaning nationalist Front National. Simi-
larly, in Italy traditional political competition was between 
a progressive left (encompassing socialists, communists 
and social democrats) and a conservative, nationalist right. 
In the 2018 Italian election, however, the main axis shifted 
as Movimento 5 Stelle became a dominant political move-
ment that opposed a progressive-economic centrist PD 
and a pro-EU party (Piú Europa) in the progressive right 
quadrant of the Italian political landscape. In the Nether-
lands, the PVV became the second largest party by increas-
ingly adopting an economic agenda of nationalist protec-
tivism, abandoning free market politics. Its main opponent 
became the right-wing progressive D66, that over time 
abandoned its economic left-wing positions and now 
strongly supports open borders, European integration and 
free market politics. In Austria, Sweden and the UK this di-
mensional shift has not totally eclipsed, but we can also 
clearly see this new party constellation emerging.
WHAT CAN THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS 
DO TO REGAIN POPULAR SUPPORT IN 
THE ERA OF POPULIST MOBILISATION?
What could prove problematic for social democrats in the 
contemporary arena of political competition is that, as cen-
trist parties, their rhetoric does not necessarily align with 
the actual stances the parties stand for. As mentioned 
above (see section on UK), the current manifesto of the 
British Labour Party is much less radical than the positions 
expressed by the party leadership. Naturally, as viable coa-
lition partners (especially in countries with PR electoral sys-
tems), social democrats need to be flexible on matters of 
crucial importance, in order to play a viable role in govern-
ment formation processes involving ideologically dissimilar 
political actors. Therefore, it is logical that social democrats 
moderate their stances when working together with cen-
trist and right-wing parties. Nevertheless, such program-
matic shifts can anger voters, especially since in the age of 
new media, voters can be targeted with certain news, 
making it difficult for political parties to conceal their sup-
port for policies that would not resonate well with their 
electorate. Therefore, social democrats should be careful 
not to succumb too much to the demands of their coalition 
partners, as it clear that the centre-left loses more votes 
than the centre-right in elections following a coalition gov-
ernment between the two.
It is especially important for social democrats to take a 
clear stance on immigration. In order to keep citizens to-
gether, social democrats need to finds a way to remedy the 
widespread anti-immigrant sentiment across European 
populations. A proportion of social democratic voters are 
uneasy with the influx of low-skilled immigrants, and par-
ticularly when they do not integrate socially and do not 
speak the native language. At the same time, social demo-
cratic core voters abhor the stigmatisation and discrimina-
tion of immigrants, meaning that social democrats need to 
balance between rights and responsibilities of newcomers. 
In line with majority opinion, immigrants are themselves 
responsible for their social and economic integration. The 
focus should be on obligations and responsibilities. Most 
social democratic voters are not against labour immigra-
tion (except for in Romania, and to a lesser extent Den-
mark), but want to avoid free riding, as it is considered un-
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Figure 22
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fair to those who do make an effort. There is substantial 
objection among large sections of the population and also 
among social democratic voters of immediate financial 
support of immigrants. To align with voter preferences, so-
cial democratic parties should emphasise that responsibili-
ties precede rights, but every responsible citizen should be 
guaranteed equal rights. 
Political parties’ stances towards the European Union are 
also increasing in importance in the eyes of voters. There 
are many people critical of the EU, without fully rejecting it. 
In fact, these ›soft Eurosceptic‹ voices are the basis to use 
for transformative politics and making a Europe that is less 
market and more a community oriented, in which wealth is 
fairly distributed. While most voters that form the core of 
social democratic support are pro-European integration, 
many of them are deeply dissatisfied with the ›over-bu-
reaucratisation‹ of the EU and also worry about regulations 
that undermine member-states’ economic sovereignty. The 
single currency and single market have eroded the mac-
ro-economic tools of national governments. To deny that is 
insulting for many of the relatively highly educated centre 
left voters. Social Democrats should put emphasis on EU-
wide policies that can make centre-left voters proud: that 
the EU establishes environmental regulations, minimal 
standards for food safety and other consumer protections, 
the abolition of roaming fees across the EU, and the possi-
bility to trade without many of the barriers previously in 
place. The EU political system is not ideal either. The dis-
connect between policy making at the EU level, while po-
litical accountability remains largely at the national parlia-
mentary level, leads to feelings of a democratic deficit. 
Although most social democratic parties have acknowl-
edged this problem for decades, not much has been done 
to remedy it. And voters notice this.
However, the main interest of centre left voters with the EU 
is not institutional, but economic. Many left-wing voters 
strongly support reforms that would curb and end austeri-
ty. Social democrats should emphasise how they will make 
large companies pay their fair share of taxation instead of 
using the European market as a space to make profit with-
out paying sufficient taxes. For example, voters are over-
whelmingly supportive of the introduction of a digital tax, 
a measure that is overwhelmingly supported by European 
citizens, even among centre- and far-right voters. Social 
democrats would benefit from imposing a fair taxation re-
gime on digital giants and multinationals, ban tax havens 
and combat money laundering.
While centre-left voters do not like polarisation between 
groups in society, they respond very positively on econom-
ic polarisation between the 1 percent and the 99 percent. 
This narrative of ›for the many, not the few‹ is precisely the 
sentiment that resonates with voters across the political 
spectrum, widely into middle-class voter segments. It has 
also proven a successful strategy in the UK (2017) and Por-
tugal (2015).
Among the left and part of the centre right there is wide-
spread support for social benefits and welfare provision, as 
means of ensuring economic protection for the most vul-
nerable sectors of the population. Emphasis should be put 
on the generational differences in terms of economic 
well-being: millennials are seriously at risk of ending up 
poorer than their parents. They are more precarious than 
previous generations, as the costs of education puts them 
into a position of debt in most countries, while house pric-
es are rising and banks unwilling to provide mortgage 
loans. Thus, while we have the highest educated genera-
tion ever, they fall behind in-house ownership, security of 
jobs and pensions, and salary levels. Obtaining a university 
degree no longer guarantees the youth’s economic suc-
cess, as many young graduates do jobs way below their 
qualifications. This unfavourable economic situation is cer-
tainly contributing to the ever-dropping birth rates and the 
economic barriers to family creation. Social Democrats can 
put an emphasis on ending the phenomenon of the »work-
ing poor« among the youth, especially among university 
graduates.
There is a generational gap in prosperity and precarity be-
tween baby-boomers and millennials that is highly prob-
lematic for social democrats. In many countries, the most 
loyal voters are from the older generations and they seek – 
rightly so – protection of their well-earned prosperity from 
the centre left. At the same time, younger generations are 
expected to pay the bill of the economic and bank crisis, 
the environmental damage and the fact that in many coun-
tries, governments ran up high debt levels to maintain wel-
fare state provisions. At the same time, the sizeable voter 
group of pensioners should also not be left behind, as their 
standards of living are deteriorating or, at best, remain sta-
ble over a very long periods of time. In the UK, pensioners 
(and lower middle-class voters) were the driving force be-
hind the Brexit vote: many observers attributed this devel-
opment to the widespread public belief that the state is un-
able to ensure adequate provision of incomes and services, 
while regularly paying the EU and bailing out banks with 
public money, without punishing the perpetrators of finan-
cial crimes. Efforts should be made by Social Democrats to 
provide the real picture of why this institutional collapse (of 
public services) is happening – largely due to right-wing 
austerity and institutional retreat, caused by budget cuts to 
government services.
While there is nearly universal support for welfare provi-
sion and social benefits (particularly for the neediest), the 
issue is different with regard to wealth redistribution. Many 
voters understand wealth redistribution as raising the tax-
es for the middle and upper classes – while they largely 
support the heavier taxation of millionaires and billionaires, 
large national companies, and multinational corporations, 
voters are more critical to high taxes on middle and up-
per-middle incomes. These views are also reflected by the 
»yellow Vests«, who demand rising the living standard of 
the poor and middle classes, while lowering taxation for all 
but the richest. If social democrats want to secure a broad 
electoral appeal, they cannot rely on improving the lives of 
the vulnerable by taking away from the middle class – they 
should rather emphasise the necessity of preventing tax 
evasion and introducing taxes on new types of profits, 
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such as digital profits. At the same time, it should be made 
clear that there will be incentives for those working hard 
and those doing their jobs better – campaigning on elimi-
nating the taxes for overtime work would resonate well 
with many working voters.
While policy-related issues and party ideology matter a lot 
during campaigning, in the digital era of political competi-
tion the faces of a political party can be as important, if nor 
even more important than policy proposals. This process, 
known as the personalization of politics, where a party 
leaders’ appeal and media performance often outweigh 
ideological debates, is rapidly accelerated by online politi-
cal campaigning. Public personalities, such as journalists, 
TV hosts and celebrities are often more electorally profita-
ble than professional politicians. The clearest example of 
such development is the success and popularity of Donald 
Trump in the United States. In Europe, as well, famous me-
dia personalities have become successful politicians – in the 
case of Italy both Matteo Salvini (leader of Lega) and Be-
ppe Grillo (former leader of MVS) has well established me-
dia careers before thrusting on the political stage.
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